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THE PROPRIETY AND SCOPE OF
CUMULATIVE REMEDIES UNDER THE

FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
Marc I Steinberg*

INTRODUCTION

In a number of cases during the past decade, the Supreme Court
has construed strictly various provisions of the federal securities laws'
2
and has applied restrictively the implied rights of action doctrine.
Nonetheless, the Court has recognized an implied private right of action
for damages under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19343
*
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This Article is dated September 1982.
1 See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (scienter required in SEC injunctive suits
under § 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), and § 17(a)(1) of
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1) (1976)); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222
(1980) (silence may operate as actionable fraud under § 10(b) only if duty to disclose exists);
Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (breach of fiduciary duty, without fraud, deception, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure, not actionable under § 10(b)); Piper v. ChrisCraft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (defeated tender offeror has no implied cause of action for
damages under § 14(e) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1976)); Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (scienter required in private damage actions
under § 10(b)); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (only purchasers and sellers have standing to bring private actions for damages under § 10(b)). Seegeneral'y
Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the FederalSecurities Laws: The Pendulum Swings,
65 GEo. L.J. 891 (1977).
2 See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (no implied private right of action under Investment Advisors Act of 1940, § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6
(1976); limited implied private right of action under Investment Advisors Act of 1940, § 215,
15 U.S.C. 80b-15 (1976)); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (no implied
private right of action under § 17(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78q(a)).
But see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982) (implied private right of action under Commodity Exchange Act); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1977) (implied private right of action under § 901(a) of Title IX of
Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1972)).
3 Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), provides:
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and rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 4 and at times has construed the
securities laws in a remedial manner. 5 These developments influence a
question of increasing importance under the federal securities laws:
whether an implied private right of action for damages exists under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 on the basis of activities that would be subject
to certain provisions that afford express remedies. Although the Court
has identified this problem in dicta, 6 it has never squarely addressed the
issue of whether the remedies afforded by the securities laws are exclu7
sive or cumulative.
A cumulative construction of the securities laws permits a party "to
invoke [a] . . .remedy in the face of a statute which may, in certain
circumstances, provide another remedy for the same conduct." 8 The
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange ....
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
4 Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
5 See, e.g., Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424 (1981) (pledge of stock as collateral for
loan is "offer or sale" of security under § 17(a) of Securities Act of 1933); United States v.
Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979) (protection of § 17(a)(1) of Securities Act of 1933 extends beyond actual purchasers and investors to brokers; "in" language of § 17(a) may be as encompassing as "in connection with" language of § 10(b); § 17(a) applies to aftermarket trading
frauds); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (recognizing
implied private right of action for damages under § 10(b)). See also Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S.Ct. 1825 (1982) (recognizing implied private right of
action for damages under Commodity Exchange Act).
6 See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 574 n.15 (1979) (without resolving
issue, Court notes that evidence exists to support the proposition that Congress intended
§ 18(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide exclusive remedy for misstatements
contained in reports filed with SEC).
7 The Supreme Court apparently will address this issue in the § 10(b) and § 11 context
in Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct.
1766 (1982). See notes 103-10, 150-56 and accompanying text infia. Various courts have employed different terminology in discussing the circumstances in which plaintiffs may pursue a
number of remedies in one action. Although this Article generally uses the term "cumulative," some courts employ the phrases "concurrent remedies," e.g., Orn v. Eastman Dillon,
Union Sec. & Co., 364 F. Supp. 352, 355 (C.D. Cal. 1973), and "overlapping remedies." E.g.,
SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 468 (1969).
8 Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 553 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946
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policy rationale for overlapping remedies is to ensure that the failure of
an injured investor to meet the technical requirements for recovering
under an express cause of action does not undermine investor protection
and the integrity of the marketplace. 9 Proponents of exclusivity, however, assert that the statutory language and legislative history of the express causes of action indicate that to recognize an implied remedy in
this context would frustrate the statutory scheme intended by Congress.' 0 They conclude that where the plaintiff cannot proceed under an
express provision, Congress intended that he not proceed at all."
Courts may differ on whether a statute providing an express remedy should also include implied remedies. For example, some courts
have construed implied actions for damages under section 10(b) and the
express provisions of section 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
4
193412 as cumulative, 3 while others have construed them as exclusive.'
Section 18(a) provides an express cause of action for damages when an
investor purchases or sells a security in reliance upon a materially false
or misleading statement that is contained in a document filed with the
SEC, where such statement affects the price of the security. If the
(1980). See generally Note, Rule lOb-5- The CircuitsDebate the Exclusivity ofRemedies, the PurchaserSeller Requirement, and Constructive Deception, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 887 (1980).
9 See notes 111-35 and accompanying text infia.
10 See, e.g., Note, Section 18 ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934" Puttingthe Bite Back Into
the Toothless Tiger, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 15 (1978); Note, The Exclusivity of the Express Remedy
Under Section 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 46 GFO. WASH. L. REV. 845 (1978).
11 See notes 106-10 and accompanying text infla.
12 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976). Section 18(a) provides:
Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement in any
application, report, or document filed pursuant to this chapter or any rule or
regulation thereunder or any undertaking contained in a registration statement as provided in subsection (d) of section 78o of this title, which statement
was at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it was made
false or misleading with respect to any material fact, shall be liable to any
person (not knowing that such statement was false or misleading) who, in
reliance upon such statement, shall have purchased or sold a security at a
price which was affected by such statement, for damages caused by such reliance, unless the person sued shall prove that he acted in good faith and had
no knowledge that such statement was false or misleading. A person seeking
to enforce such liability may sue at law or in equity in any court of competent
jurisdiction. In any such suit the court may, in its discretion, require an undertaking for the payment of the costs of such suit, and assess reasonable costs,
including reasonable attorneys' fees, against either party litigant.
The legislative history makes clear that § 18(a) applies to both misrepresentations and omissions. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Conference Report, H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 36 (1934).
13 See, e.g., Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Mktg., 650 F.2d 342 (D.C.
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 556-57 (2d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980).
14 See, e.g., McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 493 F. Supp. 631, 649-53 (N.D. Cal. 1980);
McKee v. Federal's, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,958 (E.D.
Mich. 1979); Pearlman v. Justice Mortgage Investors, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 96,518 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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Supreme Court ultimately holds section 18(a) to be exclusive, defrauded
investors who fail to meet the onerous reliance requirement 15 may be
denied any meaningful relief under the federal securities laws. 16 In contrast, if the Court deems section 18(a) to be cumulative in scope, then
investors will have a remedy, as they do now in most courts, under sec7
tion 10(b).1
This Article examines the legislative intent and policies underlying
an exclusive or a cumulative construction of the federal securities laws.
Section 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act provides the focal point for
this analysis because of the recent case law concerning it 18 and the probable draconian effect of an exclusive construction on defrauded investors
who cannot meet its technical requirements. The Article also examines
the desirability of a cumulative construction in the context of other provisions, including sections 11 and 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 and
sections 9 and 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Finally, the
Article concludes that the securities laws in general, and section 18(a) in
particular, should permit overlap between remedies in cases of fraudulent conduct, but not when the violation falls under the reporting provisions of the Securities Exchange Act.
I
THE SUPREME COURT-HAS THE PENDULUM SLOWED?

The Supreme Court's restrictive decisions in the securities law area
arguably may imply that the Court would adopt an exclusive construc15 A number of courts have held that § 18(a) is limited by its express language to documents actually "filed" with the Commission pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
See, e.g., In re Falstaff Brewing Corp. Antitrust Litig., 441 F. Supp. 62, 67 (E.D. Mo. 1977);
Rich v. Touche Ross & Co., 415 F. Supp. 95, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). But see SEC v. Keller
Indus., 342 F. Supp. 654, 658-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (interim quarterly report publicly circulated
provides basis for cause of action if materially misleading). As for the culpability requirement, the section expressly states that "good faith" is a defense to liability and that the burden of proof is upon the defendant. As the Supreme Court has observed:
Under § 18 liability extends to persons who, in reliance on such statements,
purchased or sold a security whose price was affected by the statements. Liability is limited, however, in the important respect that the defendant is accorded the defense that he acted in "good faith and had no knowledge that
such statement was false or misleading." Consistent with this language the
legislative history of the section suggests something more than negligence on
the part of the defendant is required for recovery.
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 211 n.31 (1976). Seegenerally Gruenbaum & Steinberg, Accountants'LiabilityandResponsibility:Securities, Criminaland Common Law, 13 Loy. L.A.L.
REv. 247, 250-51, 266-67 (1980).
16 See Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946
(1980). See also Greene, Determiningthe Responsibilitiesof UndaewitersDistnibutingSecurities Within
an IntegratedDisclosureSystem, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 755, 758 (1981) ("In the forty-seven years
since the enactment of section 18, there has been no reported case sustaining liability under
the section.

17
18

. . ."); notes 273-79 and accompanying text infra.

See notes 111-32, 143-70 and accompanying text infa.
See, e.g., cases cited in notes 13-14 supra.
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tion when an express remedy is available. In particular, some of the
Court's recent holdings in the section 10(b) and implied rights areas support this view.19 Although it is true that the present Court does not
embrace the proposition that the securities laws are designed to prevent
all fraudulent conduct, it is premature to conclude that the Court would
20
adhere to an exclusive construction.
Unquestionably, a number of recent decisions have narrowed the
scope of the federal securities laws. With respect to section 10(b), the
2
Court has limited standing to actual purchasers or sellers of securities, '
required scienter 22 in both private damage 23 and SEC injunctive actions, 24 required that "manipulation" or "deception," and not a "mere"
19

See, e.g., Note, supra note 10; cases cited in notes 1-2 supra. But see cases cited in note 5

supa.

20

See general4y Hazen, Symbosium Introduction-TheSupreme Court andthe Securities Laws. Has

the Pendulum Slowed?, 30 EMORY L.J. 5 (1981).

21

Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 736 (1975) ("It would indeed

be anomalous to impute to Congress an intention to expand the plaintiff class for a judicially
implied cause of action beyond the bounds it delineated for comparable express causes of
action.").
22 On this point, the Court stated:
In this opinion the term "scienter" refers to a mental state embracing intent
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. In certain areas of the law recklessness is
considered to be a form of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act. We need not address here the question whether, in some
circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b)
and Rule lob-5.
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-94 n.12 (1976); see Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S.
680, 686 n.5 (1980). For a discussion of the relevant case law on recklessness, see Steinberg &
Gruenbaum, Variations of "Recklessness" After Hochfelder and Aaron, 8 SEC. REG. L.J. 179
(1980); notes 202, 211 & 253 in/fa.
23 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). The Court reasoned that the statutory provisions expressly authorizing private recovery for negligent conduct under the Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11, 12(2), and 15, are "subject to significant procedural restrictions not
applicable under § 10(b)." Id at 208-09 (footnote omitted). Further, except for the shortswing trading proscription of§ 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, "[e]ach of the provisions
of the 1934 Act that expressly create civil liability . . . contains a state-of-mind condition
requiring something more than negligence." Id at 209 n.28; see, e.g., §§ 9(e), 18, 20 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Accordingly, the Court concluded that an extension of
private damage remedies under § 10(b) to cases of negligent wrongdoing would "nullify the
effectiveness of the carefully drawn procedural restrictions on these express actions." Id at
210 (footnote omitted).
24 Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980). The Supreme Court held that the SEC must
prove scienter as an element of a civil enforcement action to enjoin violations of § 10(b) and
rule lOb-5 prescribed thereunder, and of § 17(a)(1), but need not prove scienter under
§§ 17 (a)(2) or 17(a)(3). As Justice Blackmun had presaged in Hochfelder, see 425 U.S. at 215
(Blackmun, J., dissenting), the Court found that the language of § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 controlled regardless of the plaintiff's identity. In reaching this conclusion, the Court primarily
relied on Hochfelder's rationale. 446 U.S. at 689-95. With respect to § 17(a)(1), the Court
found that "[t]he language of § 17(a)(1), which makes it unlawful 'to employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud,' plainly evinces an intent on the part of Congress to proscribe
only knowing or intentional misconduct." Id at 696. By contrast, the Court found that
§ 17 (a)(2)'s language, "which prohibits any person from obtaining money or property 'by
means of any untrue statement of a material fact' or any omission to state a material fact, is
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breach of fiduciary duty be shown 2 5 and has declined to impose liability
based on silence where there is no duty to disclose. 26 Similarly, in the
implied rights area, the Court has abandoned a policy rationale and has
insisted on a showing of congressional intent before implying a private
27
remedy.
On the other hand, the Court's recent decisions also reflect a concern with investor protection and the integrity of the marketplace. For
29
28
example, in UnitedStatesv. Naalin the Court construed section 17(a)
of the Securities Act in the context of a criminal prosecution. In upholding Naftalin's conviction, the Court concluded that the protection of
section 17(a)(1) extends beyond actual purchasers and investors, that
the "in" language of section 17(a) may be as encompassing as the "in
connection with" language of section 10(b), and that section 17(a) apdevoid of any suggestion whatsoever of a scienter requirement." Id Also, the Court found
that "the language of§ 17(a)(3), under which it is unlawful for any person 'to engage in any
transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit,'
(emphasis added) quite plainly focuses upon the efet of particular conduct on members of
the investing public, rather than upon the culpability of the person responsible." Id. at 69697 (emphasis in original).
25 Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). In Santa Fe, minority shareholders
objected to the terms of a short-form merger entered into pursuant to a Delaware statute. In
lieu of pursuing their appraisal remedies, the minority shareholders commenced an action
seeking to set aside the merger or to recover what they claimed to be fair value of their shares.
The Supreme Court refused to recognize an actionable claim under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5
thereunder for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty where there was no deception, misrepresentation, nondisclosure, or manipulation. Id. at 473-74. For a discussion of Sante Fe and its
progeny, see Ferrara & Steinberg, A Reapprairalof Santa Fe: Rule lOb-S and the New Federalism,
129 U. PA. L. REv.263 (1980).
26 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). The Court held that silence, absent a
duty to disclose, will not give rise to § 10(b) or rule lOb-5 liability. The Court stated:
Thus, administrative and judicial interpretations have established that silence
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities may operate as a fraud
actionable under § 10(b) despite the absence of statutory language or legislative history specifically addressing the legality of nondisclosure. But such liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust
and confidence between parties to a transaction. Application of a duty to disclose prior to trading guarantees that corporate insiders, who have an obligation to place the shareholder's welfare before their own, will not benefit
personally through fraudulent use of material nonpublic information.
Id. at 230 (footnote omitted).
27 See notes 43-62 and accompanying text infra.
28 441 U.S. 768 (1979).
29 Section 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by
the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
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plies to aftermarket trading frauds.3 0 Furthermore, in Aaron v. SEC,3 1
the Court held that the SEC need not prove scienter for violations of
section 17(a) (2) and 17(a) (3),32 and subsequently held in Rubin v. United
States33 that a pledge of stock as collateral for a loan is an "offer or sale"
of a security within the meaning of section 17(a).34 In construing section
10(b), the Court in Chiarella v. United States3 5 appeared to reinforce the
principle that, insofar as insiders and their tippees are concerned, a duty
to. disclose or abstain from trading does arise when such persons are in
possession of material nonpublic information. 36 Moreover, in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 3 7 the Court implied a right to specific
relieP 8 under section 215 of the Investment Advisers Act, 39 which is similar to section 29(b) of the Exchange Act. 40 Additionally, in Steadman v.
30 441 U.S. at 772-73 & n.4. For a discussion of Naflahn and its implications, see Steinberg, Section 17(a) ofthe Securities Act of 1933 After Naftalin and Redington, 68 GEO. L.J. 163
(1979).
31 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
32 Id. at 696-97; see note 24 supra. With respect to the issuance of an injunction "upon a
proper showing" for violation of§ 17(a)(2) or § 17(a)(3), the Court pointed out that "nothing
on the face of § 20(b) [of the 1933 Act] or § 2 1(d) [of the 1934 Act] purports to impose an
independent requirement ofscienter." 446 U.S. at 700-01. In so holding, however, the Court
stated that, in an SEC action under §§ 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3), "the degree of intentional
wrongdoing evident in a defendant's past conduct" is "[a]n important factor" in determining
whether the Commission has "establish[ed] a sufficient evidentiary predicate to show that
such future violation may occur." Id. at 701. The Court concluded that the presence or
absence of scienter is "one of the aggravating or mitigating factors to be taken into account"
in a court's exercise of its equitable jurisdiction. Id. In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice
Burger deviated from the majority's rationale in this respect, asserting that the SEC "will
almost always" be required to show that the defendant's past conduct was more culpable
than negligence. The ChiefJustice concluded that "[a]n injunction is a drastic remedy, not a
mild prophylactic, and should not be obtained against one acting in good faith." Id. at 703
(Burger, C.J., concurring). For discussion on this issue, see Steinberg, SECand Other Permanent
Injunctions-Standardsfor Their Imposition, Modiftation, andDissolution, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 27,
34-41 (1980).
33
449 U.S. 424 (1981).
34 Id. at 428-3 1. The Court reasoned that the procurement of a loan secured by a pledge
of stock involves, according to the definition of the terms "offer" and "sale" contained in
§ 2(3) of the Securities Act, a "disposition of. . . [an] interest in a securiy, for value." Id. at 429
(emphasis in original). Thus, "[a]lthough pledges transfer less than absolute title, the interest
thus transferred nonetheless is an 'interest in a security."' Id.
35 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980).
36 Id. at 226-27, 230 n.12. See general' Branson, Discourse On the Supreme Court Approach to
SEC Rule lob-5 and Insider Trading, 30 EMORY LJ.263 (1981).
37 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
38 Id. at 19. In this regard, the Lewis Court did not construe § 29(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, which may be distinguished from § 215. Although rarely invoked
since its enactment, the possible implications of§ 29(b) are massive. See Regional Properties,
Inc. v. Financial & Real Estate Consulting Co., 678 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1982); Eastside Church
of Christ v. National Plan, Inc., 391 F.2d 357 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 913 (1968). See
general.y Gruenbaum & Steinberg, Section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Viable
Remedy Awakened, 48 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 1 (1979). For further discussion on § 29(b), see
notes 276-79 and accompanying text infra.
39 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1976).
40 For the text of § 29(b), see note 267 in.fra.
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SEC,4 1 the Court held that the preponderance of the evidence, rather
than the clear and convincing standard, is appropriate in SEC adminis42
trative proceedings based on fraud.
Most importantly, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran43 arguably signifies that a cumulative construction of remedies under the federal securities laws is
consistent with and supported by congressional intent. Implying private
rights of action under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), 44 the Curran Court recognized that, in the years prior to 1975, "[if a statute was
enacted for the benefit of a special class, the judiciary normally recognized a remedy for members of that class." 45 "Under this approach,
federal courts . . . regarded the denial of a[n implied] remedy as the
exception rather than the rule." 46 In Cort v. Ash, 4 7 decided in 1975, the
Court altered its approach by focusing on congressional intent. 48
In discerning congressional intent, the Curran Court stated that it
must examine the "contemporary legal context" at the time that the
legislation was enacted. 49 Elaborating, the Court reasoned:
[W]e must examine Congress' perception of the law that it was shaping or reshaping. When Congress enacts new legislation, the question
is whether Congress intended to create a private remedy as a supplement to the express enforcement provisions of the statute. When Congress acts in a statutory context in which an implied private remedy
has already been recognized by the courts, however, the inquiry logically is different. Congress need not have intended to create a new
remedy, since one already existed; the question is whether Congress
intended to preserve the preexisting remedy. 50
41
42

450 U.S. 91 (1981).
Id. at 96. In this regard, the Court premised its holding on a construction of § 7(c) of
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7(c) (1976). See Steinberg, Steadman v. SEGIts Implications and Sgniftance, 6 DEL. J. CORP. LAW 1 (1981). The Court recently granted
certiorari on the proper standard of proof in an action for damages pursuant to § 10(b) in
Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 1766
(1982). The Fifth Circuit had held in Huddlston that "clear and convincing evidence" is the
appropriate standard.
43 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982).
44 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976 ed. & Supp. III).
45 102 S. Ct. at 1837 (relying on Texas & Pacific R.R. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-40
(1916)). One such example of this approach is J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)
(recognition of implied right of action for violations of § 14(a) of Securities Exchange Act of
1934 based on need to effectuate investor protection policies of Exchange Act and need to
supplement SEC action).
46
102 S. Ct. at 1837; see cases cited in note 45 supra.
47 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
48 Id. at 78. For a statement of these criteria and subsequent application, see notes 69-91
and accompanying text infia.
49
102 S. Ct. at 1839 (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 698-99
(1979)).
50
102 S. Ct. at 1839 (citations omitted).
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In deciding Curran, the Court focused on ascertaining Congress' intent in 1974 when it "comprehensively reexamined and strengthened"
the CEA.5 ' Upon examining the case law, the Court concluded that the
federal courts had "routinely and consistently" implied private rights
under the CEA prior to the 1974 amendments. 52 Accordingly, the existence of these remedies was part of the "contemporary legal context" in
which Congress enacted the 1974 amendments. The Court, therefore,
concluded that Congress' decision not to alter the statutory provisions
that had been construed to provide implied private rights of action was
evidence that Congress affirmatively intended to preserve these preexist53
ing implied remedies.
The Curran Court recognized that the Cori v. Ash criteria for implying a private remedy had not been met with respect to certain of the
plaintiffs' claims.54 The Court asserted, however, that it was not faced
with such an inquiry. Rather than discerning Congress' intent when it
enacts "new" legislation, the Curran situation required an inquiry concerning such intent when Congress legislates in a statutory setting in
which implied rights had already been consistently and routinely recognized by the courts. Hence, the focus is on whether Congress intended
55
to preserve the preexisting implied remedy.
Such an analysis may be employed in the context of the propriety
of cumulative remedies under the federal securities laws. Congress has
significantly amended the Securities Acts in 1964, 1968, 1970, and
1975.56 As the Curran Court recognized by analogy, the existence of an
51

Id.

52

Id.

53 Id. at 1841. In dissent, Justice Powell, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, strongly disagreed with the Court's analysis. Justice Powell stated:
The [Court's] decision rests on two theories. First, the Court relies on fewer
than a dozen cases in which the lower federal courts erroneously upheld private
rights of action in the years prior to the 1974 Amendments to the CEA. Reasoning that these mistaken decisions constituted "the law" in 1974, the Court
holds that Congress must be assumed to have endorsed this path of error
when itfailedto amend certain sections of the CEA in that year. This theory is
incompatible with our constitutional separation of powers, and in my view it
is without support in logic or in law. Additionally-whether alternatively or
cumulatively is unclear-the Court finds that Congress in 1974 "affirmatively" manifested its intent to "preserve" private rights of action by adopting
particular amendments to the CEA. This finding is reached without even token deference to established tests for discerning congressional intent.
Id. at 1848 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
54 Id. at 1845 ("[P]etitioners in the three manipulation cases correctly point out that the
other sections of the CEA that they are accused of violating are framed in general terms and
do not purport to confer special rights on any identifiable class of persons.").
5
Id. at 1839. But see id. at 1848 (Powell, J., dissenting); note 53 supra. The Court
apparently declined to address the situation where Congress has not significantly amended a
statute subsequent to federal court decisions implying private rights of action. See also note 61
inra.
56
See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 30, 89 Stat. 169; Act of
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implied private right of action under section 10(b) was uniformly recognized by the lower federal courts. 5 7 Moreover, although not addressed in
Curran, these courts had consistently and routinely permitted a plaintiff
to proceed under section 10(b) even where express remedies were available. 58 Faced with these decisions recognizing cumulative remedies,
Congress never sought to modify this approach. Hence, the conclusion
may be reached that Congress intended to preserve these cumulative
59
remedies when it amended the securities laws.
This proposition may be rebutted, however, by a footnote in Curran
which asserts that, unlike the CEA, "no comparable legislative approval
or acquiescence exists for the rule lob-5 remedy."' 60 This statement appears to be misplaced. The 1975 amendments, enacted prior to Cori v.
Ash, 6 1 constituted the "most substantial and significant revision of this
country's Federal securities laws since the passage of the Securities Exchange Act in 1934. '' 62 In these amendments, Congress had ample opportunity to restrict, modify, or reject the cumulative remedy
Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 6(a), 84 Stat. 1498; Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90439, 82 Stat. 454; Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 12, 78 Stat. 565.
57 102 S. Ct. at 1840.
58 See, e.g., Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 355 (10th Cir. 1970); Jordan Bldg. Corp. v.
Doyle, O'Connor & Co., 401 F.2d 47, 50 (7th Cir. 1968); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 272-73
(9th Cir. 1961); Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670, 674 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
870 (1961); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786-87 (2d Cir. 1951); Orn v.
Eastman Dillon, Union Sec. & Co., 364 F. Supp. 352, 355 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (mem.); Stewart v.
Bennett, 359 F. Supp. 878, 881-82 (D. Mass. 1973); Colonial Realty Corp. v. Brunswick
Corp., 257 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213, 222 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 765 (D. Colo. 1964).
59 See Pitt, Implied Remedies Pendulum May Be Swinging Back, Legal Times of Washington,
May 17, 1982, at 16, 22.
60
102 S. Ct. at 1845 n.88. This statement appears inconsistent with another proposition
advanced by the Court. Quoting from his dissent in Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1
(1977), Justice Stevens, writing for the Curran Court, stated:
The statutes originally enacted in 1933 and 1934 have been amended so often
with full congressional awareness of the judicial interpretation of Rule lOb-5
as implicitly creating a private remedy that we must now assume that Congress intended to create rights for the specific beneficiaries of the legislation as
well as duties to be policed by the SEC ...
102 S. Ct. at 1846 n.92 (quoting 430 U.S. at 55 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
61 The 1975 amendments were enacted on June 4, 1975. Securities Act Amendments of
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-79, § 30, 89 Stat. 97. The Court decided Cort . Ash on June 17, 1975.
Although not entirely clear from the Curran Court's analysis, it may be that a more explicit
showing of congressional intent is required for statutes amended after Cori was decided. On
the other hand, a plausible argument can be made that the crucial criterion is whether the
courts were "routinely and consistently" implying a private right of action for the statute
under judicial review, independent of when such decisions were handed down. Under this
rationale, the date on which Core was decided goes only to the more stringent standard that
courts after Cori use to determine the implication of remedy question where there is "new"
legislation; the date has no relevance in ascertaining whether Congress intended to preserve a
preexisting remedy.
62 Securities Act Amendments of 1975 Hearingson S 249 Before the Subcomm. on Securities ofthe
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Afairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975); see Pitt,supra
note 59, at 22.
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construction adopted by the courts, but declined to do so. According to
the language of Curran, therefore, "the fact that a comprehensive reexamination and significant amendment of the [federal securities laws] left
intact the statutory provisions under which the federal courts had implied a cause of action is itself evidence that Congress affirmatively in'63
tended to preserve that remedy.
As further support for a cumulative approach, the Curran Court implied private rights of action under the CEA even though the 1974
amendments created reparation and arbitration procedures through
which future traders might seek relief for violations of the Act.64 It may
be argued that permitting cumulative remedies where there are "informal" administrative procedures, such as arbitration and reparation, 65 is
far different than where there are express judicial remedies, such as
those provided in the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts. 66 This assertion is
undoubtedly valid, but is irrelevant when considered in the legislative
framework of these Acts. In the case of the CEA, there were few court
decisions construing the effect of these informal procedures on the implication of private remedies and no subsequent congressional legislation of
a substantial nature. 67 Cumulative remedies under the federal securities
laws, on the other hand, have an established tradition and were subject
to revision, if Congress so chose, on four different occasions when it sig68
nificantly amended these laws.

Thus, it may be argued persuasively that if courts were to apply the
Curran rationale in determining whether to adopt a cumulative or exclusive construction of the securities laws, they should permit overlap between the express and implied remedies. If courts decline to employ the
Curran analysis in this context, however, then a crucial issue concerns the
continued vitality of the Cort v. Ash test for determining the existence of
an implied private cause of action under a federal statute. The Cori
formulation provides a four-prong standard:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted,"-that is, does the statute create a federal right
in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative
intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny
one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is
the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area
63
64
65

102 S. Ct. at 1841; see note 60 supra.
Id at 1842.
The Court concluded that "the legislative evidence indicates that these informal [rep-

aration and arbitration] procedures were intended to supplement rather than supplant the
implied judicial remedy." Id
66 See Pitt, supra note 59, at 22.
67 See 102 S. Ct. at 1842-43.
68 See notes 56-63 and accompanying text supra.
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basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate
69
to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?

In subsequent decisions, the Court has embraced the Cori test with
varying levels of enthusiasm. 70 In Cannon v. University of Chicago,71 the
Court first voiced its dissatisfaction with the Cori standard while implying a private remedy under Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972.72 The Court concluded that the far better course is for Congress
to create an express cause of action when it desires to afford private
litigants with the right to seek redress. However, "under certain limited
circumstances," such a failure by Congress is not inconsistent with its
intent to have the Court imply an appropriate private remedy. Because
the issue before the Court presented "the atypical situation in which all
of the [Corti] circumstances that the Court [had] previously identified as
supportive of an implied remedy [were] present," the majority concluded that an implied cause of action could properly be inferred. 73 Justice Rehnquist emphasized in a concurring opinion that the question of
determining whether to imply a private cause of action is one of statutory construction. He noted that recent cases, such as Cori, had approached the implication of the private remedy issue more stringently
than the Court did previously and cautioned "that the ball, so to speak,
may now be in [Congress'] court."'74 Under Justice Rehnquist's view,
the Court should be extremely reluctant to imply private remedies without sufficient specificity by Congress. 75 Justice Powell went further in
his dissent, asserting that the four-prong Cori standard must be abandoned not only on policy grounds, but because the Cort analysis does not
comport with the doctrine of the separation of powers: "The 'four factor' analysis of that case is an open invitation to federal courts to legislate causes of action not authorized by Congress. It is an analysis not
faithful to constitutional principles and should be rejected. ' 76 This as77
sertion was explicitly rejected by the Curran Court.
69 422 U.S. at 78 (citations omitted). See discussion in notes 47-48, 54-55 and accompanying text supra.
70 See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60-61 n.10 (1978); Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 37-41 (1977).
71 441 U.S. 677 (1979).

72

20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976).

73
74

441 U.S. at 717.
Id at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).

75

Id

76

Id at 731 (Powell, J., dissenting); see Steinberg, Implied Private Rights ofAction Under

FederalLaw, 55 NoTR DAME LAw. 33, 40 (1979) ("Justice Powell's assertion that the courts
are pursuing an unconstitutional course is premised on unduly strict notions of judicial
restraint.").
77 102 S. Ct. at 1838 (Court expressly finds "no merit to the argument. . . that the
judicial recognition of an implied private remedy violates the separation of powers doctrine.')
(relying on Montana-Dakota Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 261-62 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
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The Court further modified the four-prong Cori test in Touche Ross

& Co. V. Redington, 78 in which it refused to imply a private cause of action for damages under section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. 79 Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the
decision to imply a private right of action is limited "solely" to a determination of congressional intent. 80 The Court in its holding refused to
accord equal weight to the four Cort principles. Rather, when a statute
does not provide private rights to any identifiable class, does not prohibit any conduct as unlawful, and has a legislative history that is silent
or ambiguous on the existence of private remedies, the Court will find
that no congressional intent to create a private remedy exists. A court is
obligated in such cases not to consider the third and fourth prongs of the
Cori test, namely, whether the implication of a private remedy is necesand whether the action is one
sary to effectuate the statute's purpose
8
'
law.
state
to
traditionally relegated
The Court reaffirmed the apparent demise of the Cor test in
TransamenicaMortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis.8 2 The Court, relying on Redinglon, held that the central inquiry in determining whether to imply a
private right of action is an examination of congressional intent.8 3 The
Court embraced a restrictive approach to the implied remedy question 84
78. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
79 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a)(1) (1976). Section 17(a) requires broker-dealers and others to
maintain and file such books and records as the Commission "may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
80 442 U.S. at 568.
81 Id at 575-76. The Reding/on Court enunciated other principles to aid in ascertaining
Congress' intent in the implication of a private remedy when the legislative history is silent or
ambiguous. First, when a statute's primary focus is to prevent or forestall future harm rather
than to provide recompense after a violation has occurred, this militates against implication.
Id at 570-71. Second, when a statute provides other private remedies, the inference arises
that "when Congress wished to provide a private damages remedy, it knew how to do so and
did so expressly." Id at 572. This principle is inconsistent with the Court's holding in Cannon
"that other provisions of a complex statutory scheme create express remedies has not been
accepted as a sufficient reason for refusing to imply an otherwise appropriate remedy under a
separate section." Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 711 (1979). Finally, if the
principal express civil remedy is directed at essentially the same type of misconduct as the
statute at issue and if Congress passed the two provisions contemporaneously, the Court will
be "extremely reluctant to imply a cause of action in [the statute in question] that is significantly broader than the remedy that Congress chose to provide." 442 U.S. at 574.
82 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
83 Id at 15-16.
84 The Court stated:
The question whether a statute creates a cause of action, either expressly or by
implication, is basically a matter ofstatutory construction. While some opinions of the Court have placed considerable emphasis upon the desirability of
implying private rights of action in order to provide remedies thought to effectuate the purposes of a given statute, what must ultimately be determined
is whether Congress intended to create the private remedy asserted, as our
recent decisions have made clear. We accept this as the appropriate inquiry
to be made in resolving the issues presented by the case before us.
Id at 15-16 (citations omitted).
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in holding that no implied private right of action for damages existed
under section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act, 85 even though the
86
provision was "intended to benefit the clients of investment advisers."
The Supreme Court, however, revived the Cori standard in more
87
recent cases involving implied rights of action in non-securities areas.
Califomia v. Sierra Club 88 highlights the split on the Court with regard to
the continued viability of the Cort four-prong test. The majority applied
the Cori standard and refused to recognize an implied right of action
under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act, 89 stating:
Combined, these four factors present the relevant inquiries to pursue
in answering the recurring question of implied causes of action. Cases
subsequent to Corl have explained that the ultimate issue is whether
Congress intended to create a private right of action, but the four
factors specified in Cori remain the "criteria through which this intent
could be discerned." 90
Justice Rehnquist in a separate concurring opinion asserted that "the
Court's opinion places somewhat more emphasis on Core v. Ash than is
warranted in light of several more recent 'implied right of action' decisions which limit it."91
Although not generally embracing the expansionist holdings of yesteryear, 92 these recent decisions indicate that the Court has eschewed a
85
15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976). Section 206 broadly proscribes fraudulent or other deceptive acts and practices by investment advisers.
86 444 U.S. at 17.
87 See California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 292-95 (1981); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Transport Workers Union of America, 451 U.S. 77, 91 (1981); Universities Research Ass'n,
Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 770 (1981).
88
451 U.S. 287 (1981).
89 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976).
90 451 U.S. at 293 (citations omitted) (quoting Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241
(1979)); see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825, 1837-41
(1982) (supporting application of Cort v.Ash criteria if Cori were applicable); Texas Indus. v.
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981) (citing with approval Californiav. Sierra Club
and Cori v.Ash).
91 451 U.S. at 302 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted). For
articles addressing implied rights of action, see Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L.
REV. 553 (1981); Hazen, Implied Private Remedies Under FederalStatutes: Neither a Death Knell
Nor a Moratorium--CivilRights, SecuritiesRegulation, and Bond, 33 VAND. L. REv. 1333 (1980);
Steinberg, supra note 76; Comment, Implied Rights of Action in Federal Legislation: Harmonization
Within the Statutogy Scheme, 1980 DUKE LJ. 928; Comment, The Federal Securities Acts: The
Demise of the Implied Private Rights Doctrine, 1980 U. ILL L.F. 627.
92 It may be argued, however, that Curran is such an expansionist holding. See generalbi
notes 43-68 and accompanying text supra. The same can be said for Nafalin. See notes 28-30
and accompanying text supra. For expansionist holdings of yesteryear, see, e.g., Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (relaxing common-law reliance requirement in
cases of nondisclosure under § 10(b)); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,
404 U.S. 6 (1971) (recognizing implied right of action for damages under § 10(b); applying
that provision where there was an arguably tenuous connection between the securities transaction and the fraudulent activity); SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969) (recognizing SEC's authority to regulate activies of insurance companies); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
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limiting rationale for the federal securities laws. The Court has recognized a private right of action for damages under section 10(b), 93 and
even in its restrictive implication cases, has refused to deny implied remedies to all private claimants. 94 Recent implication cases, particularly
Curran and California v. Sierra Club, arguably support the continued viability of cumulative remedies.
Several conclusions follow from this analysis. First, if an exclusive
construction of section 18(a) is adopted, aggrieved parties would be denied meaningful redress under the federal securities laws. This result is
contrary to the thrust of decisions such as Pierand Lewis, 95 and ignores
section 10(b)'s unique status within the fabric of the federal securities
laws.96 Second, under the Cori and Curran standards, implied rights may
be found in the absence of explicit congressional intent. As Curran suggests, in ascertaining this intent, it is highly significant, if not determinative, that Congress has amended the securities acts on a number of
occasions and was presumably aware that the courts were "routinely
and consistently" applying section 10(b) in a cumulative manner. 9 7 Finally, exclusivity of express and implied remedies would frustrate two
fundamental purposes underlying the legislative scheme: maintaining
investor protection and the integrity of the marketplace. 98 From this
perspective, it is quite plausible that the Supreme Court would adopt a
cumulative construction when presented with the issue. In any event,
the adherence to an exclusive rationale by some lower courts, premised
primarily on perceived restrictive Supreme Court decisions, is
misplaced.
U.S. 426 (1964) (recognizing implied private right of action for damages under § 14(a) of
Exchange Act); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (upholding
requirement under Investment Advisers Act that registered investment advisers disclose personal financial interest in securities that they recommend to clients).
93
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971).
94
See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (right to
specific and limited relief under § 215 of Investment Advisers Act); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (issue of implied private right of action for target shareholders expressly left open); Hazen, supra note 20, at 15.
95
See note 94 supra.
96 See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577-78 n.19 (1979).
97
See 102 S.Ct. at 1839; notes 43-68 and accompanying text supra; see, e.g., Andrus v.
Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 57 (1979) ("[I]t is particularly relevant that Congress has twice reviewed
and amended the statute without rejecting the Department's view. . . ."); Lorillard v. Pons,
434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978) ("Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial
interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without
change."); Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 413 (1962) ("Congress is the proper agency to
change an interpretation of the [Securities Exchange] Act unbroken since its passage, if the
change is to be made."). See also Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 828 (1976) ("[T]he relevant
inquiry is not whether Congress correctly perceived the then state of the law, but rather what
its perception of the state of the law was.').
98 See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 774-77 (1979).
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II
LOWER COURT DECISIONS

Prior to recent Supreme Court decisions restricting the scope of section 10(b), 99 the lower federal courts generally held that a section 10(b)
action based on fraud 0 0 could be instituted for conduct covered by the
express liability provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.' 0 ' For example, in
Fischman v. Raytheon Manufacturing Co., 102 the district court held that allowing a section 10(b) claim would circumvent the restrictions contained in section 11.103 The Second Circuit reversed, reasoning that
"when, to conduct actionable under § 11 of the 1933 Act, there is added
the ingredient of fraud, then that conduct becomes actionable under
99 See notes 21-27 and accompanying text supra.
100 Prior to Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), a number of courts permitted a § 10(b) action for damages to be premised on negligence. See, e.g., White v. Abrams, 495
F.2d 724, 730-35 (9th Cir. 1974) (negligence may suffice under flexible duty standard); Myzel
v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 735 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968) (negligence
suffices).
101 See, e.g., Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank of Lincolnwood, 509 F.2d 1287, 1292 (7th Cir.
1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976); Jordan Bldg. Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor & Co., 401
F.2d 47, 50 (7th Cir. 1968); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 272-73 (9th Cir. 1961); Matheson v.
Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670, 674 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 870 (1961); Fischman v.
Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786-87 (2d Cir. 1951); Beecher v. Able, 435 F. Supp. 397,
412-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Orn v. Eastman Dillon, Union Sec. & Co., 364 F. Supp. 352 (C.D.
Cal. 1973) (mem.); Stewart v. Bennett, 359 F. Supp. 878, 881-84 (D. Mass. 1973). But see
Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 355 (10th Cir. 1970) ("Since in this case recovery is sought
under both [§ 12(2) and rule lOb-5], we resolve any conflict between them in favor of Section
12(2), where the statutory remedy is explicit."). See also 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS,
SECURITIEs FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD § 2.4(1), at 27-34 (1981).
102 9 F.R.D. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), reod, 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
103 9 F.R.D. at 710-11. Section 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(1)-(5) (1976), provides:
(a) Personspossessing cause ofaction; persons liable. In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effective, contained an untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be
stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, any
person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at the time of such
acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may, either at law or in
equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue(1) every person who signed the registration statement;
(2) every person who was a director of (or person performing similar
functions) or partner in the issuer at the time of the filing of the part of the
registration statement with respect to which his liability is asserted;
(3) every person who, with his consent, is named in the registration statement as being or about to become a director, person performing similar functions, or partner;
(4) every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profession gives authority to a statement made by him, who has with his consent
been named as having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement, or as having prepared or certified any report or valuation which is used
in connection with the registration statement, with respect to the statement in
such registration statement, report, or valuation, which purports to have been
prepared or certified by him;
(5) every underwriter with repsect to such security.
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§ 10(b) of the 1934 Act and the Rule.

. ...-104 Courts have also permitted cumulative remedies between sections 10(b) and 18(a) under a simi10 5
lar rationale.
Some lower courts, pointing to recent Supreme Court decisions,
have adopted an exclusive construction holding that an overlap of remedies would frustrate the statutory scheme. For example, in McFarlandv.
Memorex Corp., 106 the district court was reluctant, in the absence of explicit congressional intent, to permit the plaintiff to pursue an alternative remedy under section 10(b) where the alleged misdeeds were within
the Securities Act's express remedial provisions. 10 7 Similarly, in a case
dealing with the exclusivity of remedies between sections 10(b) and
18(a), the district court-in McKee v. Federals,Inc., 108 held that "[s]ince the
§ 18 remedy (an express statutory provision) is not unavailable to plaintiff the invocation of an implied rule 10b-5 remedy may not be
countenanced."' 10 9

Courts adhering to the exclusivity rationale also rely on the procedural requirements of the express provisions that are absent from the
implied remedies. Accordingly, a cumulative construction would allow
a plaintiff to maintain an implied right of action under circumstances
where an express remedy would be unavailable. Courts strictly constru104
188 F.2d at 787. In Fischman, the plaintiffs did not have a cause of action under § 11
because they did not purchase the registered securities. Id at 786-87.
105 See, e.g., Seiden v. Nicholson, 69 F.R.D. 681 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (court refuses to require
plaintiffs to proceed under § 18 rather than under § 10(b)); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (court refused to dismiss concurrent claims under §§ 18 and 10(b)); Hoover
v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (cause of action available under both provisions).
Although the Supreme Court has apparently rejected the statutory-tort theory, Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), previous lower court decisions relied upon the
concept as a justification for cumulative remedies. The statutory-tort theory is a common-law
doctrine that holds that persons injured by a violation of a statute enacted for their benefit
are entitled to recover damages for their injury. See 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra
note 101, § 2. 4 (1)(a), at 29-31. These courts reasoned that because Congress enacted the securities statutes to protect investors, such person should be compensated for their injury even
if they invoked an implied rather than an applicable express remedy. See, e.g., Royal Air
Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 213 (9th Cir. 1962); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co.,
188 F.2d 783, 786-87 (2d Cir. 1951); Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869, 879 (S.D.N.Y.
1949); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
Courts also have relied upon the statutory avoidability theory embodied in § 29(b) of the
1934 Act to support cumulative remedies. See, e.g., Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312
F.2d 210, 213 (9th Cir. 1962); see note 40 and accompanying text supra; notes 276-79 and
accompanying text inj/a.
106 493 F. Supp. 631 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
107 Id at 653-55; see Berger v. Bishop Inv. Corp., 528 F. Supp. 346 (E.D. Mo. 1981). But
see Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961) (court allows private remedy under § 10(b)).
108 [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,958 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
109 Id at 96,023; see Kulchock v. Government Employees Ins. Co., [1977-78 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,002 (D.D.C. 1977), order withdrawn in light offnaljudgment and settlement, C.A. No. 76-206 (D.D.C. July 28, 1978); cases cited in note 14 supra. See
also Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds, Inc., 682 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1982) (private remedy
under § 9 of Exchange Act is exclusive).
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ing the statutory scheme find that this consequence is incompatible with
congressional intent.' 10
The majority of courts, however, have adopted a cumulative construction both with respect to overlap between section 10(b) and sections
11 and 12(2) of the Securities Act, and between section 10(b) and sections 9 and 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act.I' The Second Circuit
addressed the question of cumulative remedies between sections 10(b)
and 18(a) in Ross v. A.H. Robins Co. 112 In Ross, the plaintiffs alleged that
the defendants had manipulated and artificially inflated the market
price of Robins' common stock by disseminating false and misleading
information concerning the effectiveness and safety of the Dalkon
Shield, an intrauterine birth control device that it manufactured, and
by failing to reveal information which suggested that the shield was less
effective and more dangerous than the company's earlier public statements had indicated. 113 The plaintiffs alleged that the company had
made misleading statements in both SEC filings 1 4 and public an110 See McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 493 F. Supp. 631, 653-55 (N.D. Cal. 1980). For
example, §§ 11 and 12 of the Securities Act are subject to § 13, which contains a general oneyear statute of limitations upon the discovery of the untrue statement or omission. Section 13
also provides that "[i]n no event shall any such action be brought to enforce a liability created
under section 11 or section 12(1) more than three years after the security was bona fide offered to the public, or under section 12(2) more than three years after the sale." In contrast,
no statute of limitations accompanies implied actions under § 10(b), and, accordingly, the
appropriate state statute of limitations must be applied. See, e.g., IDS Progressive Fund, Inc.
v. First of Mich. Corp., 533 F.2d 340, 344 (6th Cir. 1976) (Michigan's six-year limitations
period applies to § 10(b) claim); cases cited in note 215 infa.
Another rationale supporting exclusivity is that strike suits may become more prevalent
if plaintiffs are permitted to pursue cumulative remedies. A strike suit involves litigation
which, by objective standards, has little chance of success at trial but has a settlement value to
the plaintiff disproportionate to its prospect for success. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975). Since exclusivity would bar a significant amount of
litigation that would be permitted by courts recognizing cumulative remedies, concern for
strike suits may be advanced as a justification for exclusivity. But see note 235 infia.
111 See, e.g., Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 540-43 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 1766 (1982); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Mktg.
Corp., 650 F.2d 342, 354-59 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); Ross v. A.H.
Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 553-56 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980); Steele v.
Allison, [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,459 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Roth
v. Bank of the Commonwealth, [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,267,
at 91,714-15 (W.D.N.Y. 1981); Seiffer v. Topsy's Int'l, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 653, 662 (D. Kan.
1980); Abrams v. Johns Mansville Corp., [1979-80 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,305, at 97,089 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., [1978 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,546 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Beecher v. Able, 435 F. Supp.
397,412 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Gross v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, 431 F. Supp. 1080, 1094-95
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). But see Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 98,777 (5th Cir. 1982).
112 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cerM denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980).
113

Id

at 549.

114 The allegedly misleading statements were contained in annual reports filed with the
Commission pursuant to Form 10-K. Id

1982]

CUMULATIVE REMEDIES

nouncements.11 5 The plaintiffs, who purchased Robins stock when the

allegedly misleading statements were made, brought an action under
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 after the stock plummeted upon public dis16
closure of the product's problems.
The district court, relying on the procedural restrictions embodied
in section 18(a), 117 rejected the section 10(b) claim and held that section
18(a) was the exclusive remedy for the fraudulent conduct alleged. 118
The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the section 10(b) remedy does
not nullify the limitations and requirements of section 18 (a).' 19 In addition, the court found that policy considerations militate against an ex-

120
clusive construction of section 18(a).
The Second Circuit had previously held that whenever the conduct
alleged contains an ingredient of fraud, and other conditions are met,121
section 10(b) is applicable regardless of the availability of an express
cause of action. 122 After recognizing this proposition, the court addressed the argument that permitting the section 10(b) claim circumvents the stringent requirements of section 18(a). Rejecting this
argument, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs sought to invoke section
10(b) "to state a claim that is beyond the scope of § 18-the latter section furthering the narrow and particularized objective of encouraging
use of and reliance upon records filed with the SEC, by expressly authorizing damage suits against those who make them depositaries of materially false or misleading statements."' 123 The court reasoned further

115

The allegedly misleading statements were contained in four press releases during a 12-

month period. Id
116 The named plaintiffs and members of the class alleged that they purchased Robins
stock based upon the misleading public information that Robins released. The value of the
common stock dropped from $19 to $13 on the New York Stock Exchange following investigations by the Food and Drug Administration and the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, and the institution of over 500 product-liability suits against Robins. Id at 550.
117 See notes 12-16 and accompanying text supra
118 465 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The court initially found that the reach of the two
provisions was significantly different. The court noted that while a plaintiff may assert a
claim under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 for statements made in a press release, such a claim could
not be asserted under § 18. Second, the court pointed to the stricter reliance standard required for a § 18 action. Third, the court recognized the three-year statute of limitations for
§ 18 actions and the absence of any explicit statute of limitations for § 10(b) actions. Finally,
the court noted that § 18 permits courts to assess payment of costs of the action, while § 10(b)
does not provide for a comparable undertaking. Id at 910-13.
119 607 F.2d 545, 553-56 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980).
120 Id at 556.
121 For example, the plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of securities. Blue Chips
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
122 607 F.2d at 555.
123 Id at 556. In this regard, the court stated:
To now hold, at this late date, that conduct is not proscribed by § 10(b)
merely because it is also subject to § 18 would effectively deprive open market
investors. . . of any remedy simply because the misinformation happened to
be lodged in a form filed with the S.E.C. Such a result would be remarkably
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that a plaintiff seeking to recover under section 10(b) must plead and
prove scienter, whereas section 18(a) does not saddle a complainant with
this significant burden. 124 The court employed this distinction as an additional justification for allowing a section 10(b) action in spite of sec25
tion 18(a)'s rigorous reliance requirement.
The court also relied on policy considerations in its endorsement of
cumulative remedies. The court found it incongruous to deprive open
market investors of a section 10(b) remedy -for fraudulent conduct simply because a document filed with the SEC happened to contain misinformation. Moreover, the court concluded that forcing plaintiffs to
proceed under section 18 because the statements were filed with the
SEC would encourage corporate malfeasants to include their misrepresentations in materials filed with the Commission, "for the sole purpose
of insulating themselves from liability under § 10(b) and restricting the
class of potential plaintiffs to the unlikely few who actually viewed and
126
relied on the misleading information."'
The District of Columbia Circuit followed and expanded Robins in
Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. NationalStudent Marketing Corp.127 In Wachovia Bank, the defendants contended that section 18(a) provided the exclusive remedy for alleged misstatements contained in documents filed
with the SEC pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act, and that section
12(2) of the Securities Act 28 afforded the exclusive remedy for stateincongruous in view of the fact that it is the open market investor who over
the years has become one of the prime beneficiaries of the protections afforded
by § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
Id
124
125
126

Id at 555-56.
Id; see notes 12-16 and accompanying text supra.
607 F.2d at 556. Accordingly, the court concluded:
In view of the alternatives that face us, we choose the one which we believe
gives controlling weight to the fundamental policies underlying the securities
acts and which recognizes that § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 have become, by careful judicial construction, the primary mechanisms by which open market investors can seek redress against those who manipulate the market by
fraudulent activity.

Id
127 650 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981). The Wachovia plaintiffs purchased nearly five million dollars of National Student Marketing stock (NSMC) in a
private placement in 1969. Following the merger of NSMC and Interstate National Corporation, the stock fell from 69 1/2 on December 17, 1969 to 16 on February 17, 1970. Numerous
suits were filed against NSMC, NSMC's counsel, and NSMC's accountants. The Wachovia
litigation concerned alleged misrepresentations about NSMC's financial condition in press
releases, oral statements, reports filed with the SEC, and other published reports not filed
with the Commission. Id at 345. See generally Ferrara & Steinberg, The Role ofInside Counsel in
the CorporateAccountability Process, 4 CORP. L. REv. 3 (1981); Gruenbaum, Corporate/Securities
Lawyers: Disclosure, Responsibility, Liability to Investors and National Student Marketing Corp.,
54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 795 (1979).
128 Section 12(2), 15 U.S.C. 771(2) (1976), provides:
Any person who(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions of
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ments that were not contained in such filed documents. 129
The District of Columbia Circuit rejected these contentions. Regarding the impact of the express remedies on section 10(b), the court
pointed out that "the nature of the legislative process militates against
each enactment's being self-contained and mutually exclusive of every
other enactment." 30 The court further reasoned that the express remedies are designed to treat different problems and be applicable in different situations, and therefore are "totally different" from the implied
remedy of section 10(b). For example, although various restrictions that
apply in suits seeking relief under the express remedies are absent in
section 10(b) actions, these restrictions are counterbalanced by that provision's scienter requirement. 13 1 Accordingly, the court concluded that
a cause of action may be implied under section 10(b), "irrespective of
the possibility of overlap between that implied cause of action and ex32
press remedies provided by other sections of the securities laws."'
section 77c of this title, other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of said
section), by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or
oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or
omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the
purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, ofsuch untruth or omission, shall be liable to
the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or
in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration
paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income
received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no
longer owns the security.
129 See Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 461 F. Supp. 999,
1005-06 (D.D.C. 1978) (adopting cumulative construction but finding action barred by statute of limitations), rev'don olherground, 650 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (reversing time bar and
upholding cumulative construction), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981). The district court, in
adopting a cumulative construction, stated that "[a]n implied cause of action should be available even where the alleged misconduct also falls completely within the confines of an express
remedy." 461 F. Supp. at 1006 n.15.
130
650 F.2d at 355.
131 Id at 355-57. For example, the court stated that "[t]he higher burden of proof under
Section 10(b) is clearly a trade-off for the limitations on section 11 claims . . . ." Id at 356.
At another point, the court likewise reasoned that "the more stringent fraud requirement of
Section 10(b) serves as a trade-off for Section 12(2)'s short statute of limitations and apparent
restriction of defendants to sellers of securities." Id
132 Id at 359. In so holding, the court adopted the SEC's position. Appearing as amicus
curiae, the Commission stated:
The Commission is concerned by the defendants' argument in this case that
investors may be excluded from this well-established implied private remedy
for deceptive conduct by the possible existence of narrowly drawn express
remedies, and particularly by Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. 78r, the remedy designed only for persons who actually read and rely
upon corporate filings with the Commission, which does not and cannot redress the fraud here alleged. Should the defendants' arguments be accepted,
a major incentive for issuers of securities to make full and fair disclosure when
releasing information to the public securities marketplaces would be removed.
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Subsequently, in Huddleston v. Hennan & MacLean, 133 the Fifth Circuit adhered to a cumulative construction in permitting a section 10(b)
claim to proceed even though sections 11 and 12(2) of the Securities Act
covered the alleged conduct. The court premised its holding upon the
more stringent section 10(b) scienter requirement and upon policy considerations, 134 concluding that "[w]hile Sections 11 and 12(2) of the

1933 Act, like Section 18 of the 1934 Act, contain limitations and requirements not exacted of Section 10(b) litigants, allowing invocation of
the Section 10(b) remedy does not impermissibly nullify those
1 35

constraints."
In one respect, however, the Fifth Circuit's reasoning is misplaced.

In adopting a cumulative construction, the court asserted that limiting
the plaintiffs to the remedies provided by sections 11 and 12(2) would
induce corporate malfeasants to limit their liability by including misleading statements in prospectuses filed with the SEC. 136 Although such
reasoning may be persuasive when section 18(a) is the express provision
at issue, 137 it is not valid when sections 11 and 12(2) are applicable.

Ordinarily, plaintiffs seeking to recover under these provisions are not
required to establish reliance as they are under section 18(a). 138 Moreover, section 11, and section 12(2) if strict privity between the purchaser
and seller is relaxed,' 39 provide aggrieved litigants with viable remeMoreover, an issuer bent on fraud, as is alleged to be the case here, could
effectively diminish its exposure to liability for misleading statements by
merely including those statements in documents filed with the Commission,
thereby insulating itself from a claim under Rule lOb-5 because very few investors actually see documents filed with the Commission. Thus, those very
documents intended to provide investors with a degree of protection could
operate as a tool for their deception. Such a result would turn the Commission's salutary and important reporting requirements into a shield for the cunning and "a snare and delusion" for the investor.
Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission at 3-4, Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v.
National Student Mktg. Corp., 650 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954
(1981).
133 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 1766 (1982).
134

Id at 540-43.

135
136
137
138

Id at 542.
Id at 542-43.
See notes 12-16 and accompanying text supra.
As stated by Jennings and Marsh:

Proof of reliance by the plaintiff on the false or misleading statement is not
necessary in an action under Section 12(2), as it normally is not in an action
under Section 11; but . . . a plaintiff who acquired the security after the issuer made an earnings statement covering a 12-month period after the effective date "generally available" must prove reliance in an action under Section
11.
R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 778 (5th ed. 1982).
139 See, e.g., Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1981); Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487
F.2d 617, 621 (5th Cir. 1973); Hagert v. Glickman, 520 F. Supp. 1028 (D. Minn. 1981); Mendelsohn v. Capital Underwriters, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1069, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
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dies. 140 Thus, far from being a dead letter, these provisions should be
14
viewed with trepidation by potential violators. '
III
A SUGGESTED APPROACH
The central inquiry is not only whether courts should adhere to a
cumulative construction, but also under what provisions, if any, they
should adopt this approach. The following discussion addresses the propriety and scope of cumulative remedies when fraud is an ingredient of
the complainant's claim, and the party alleges violations of: (1) section
10(b) and section 18(a); (2) comparable provisions to section 18(a);
(3) section 10(b) and section 12(2); (4) section 10(b) and section 11, and
(5) section 10(b) and section 9. The discussion then focuses on the propriety of cumulative remedies when the complainant alleges violations
of a reporting provision of the Exchange Act and section 18(a). Finally,
assuming that an exclusive construction of section 18(a) ultimately is
adopted, the discussion addresses how the provision should be con14 2
strued, and explores whether alternative remedies are available.
A. Section 10(b) and Section 18(a)
Primarily because of the provision's rigid criteria, a suit based solely
upon section 18(a) has never succeeded. 143 Section 18(a) contains strict
standards of reliance and causation and also requires the plaintiff to be a
purchaser or seller. 144 In addition, section 18(c) sets forth fairly stringent time limitations for bringing a cause of action.1 45 The difficulty of
satisfying these standards has prompted plaintiffs in every reported case
to couple their section 18(a) claim with an additional cause of action.
By permitting plaintiffs to proceed under multiple causes of action,
courts have provided them with a realistic opportunity for redress. In
contrast, courts holding section 18(a) to be exclusive have effectively
precluded such plaintiffs from any hope of recovery under the federal
See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 138, at 833-35, 841.
141 See, e.g., Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1981); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F.
Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Folk, Civil Liabilily Under the FederalSecurities Acts: The BarChris
Case, 55 VA. L. REv. 1 (1969).
142 Section 10(b) potentially overlaps with a number of other express liability provisions,
including § 15 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976), and §§ 16(b) and 20 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78p(b), 78t (1976).
143 See Greene, supra note 16, at 758.
144 For the complete text of § 18(a), see note 12 supr,,
145
Section 18(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(c) (1976), provides that "[n]o action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under this section unless brought within one year after
the discovery of the facts constituting the cause of action and within the three years after such
cause of action accrued."
140
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46

Satisfying the reliance standard under section 18(a) is a particularly
onerous task. Courts have held that a plaintiff must establish "eyeball
reliance"' 14 7 upon the allegedly false or misleading statement contained
in a document filed with the SEC. 148 Thus, an investor must prove that
he actually read the filed document or a copy thereof containing the
statement.1 49 Given the average investor's propensity to scrutinize such
corporate documents, 150 it is apparent that this requirement presents a
major obstacle to plaintiffs seeking to maintain a section 18(a) cause of
action.
Similarly, the provision's causation requirement poses potential difficulties for the plaintiff who seeks to invoke section 18(a). The plaintiff
bears the "double-barrelled"' 15 1 burden of demonstrating that the false
or misleading statement both affected the price of the security and damaged him. 152 The harshness of the foregoing criteria has impelled several courts to permit plaintiffs to couple their section 18(a) right of
action with an additional cause of action under the federal securities
laws. 153
146 Plaintiffs, depending on the circumstances, may have a remedy under state law, based
either on common-law fraud or on a violation of the pertinent Blue Sky provision. A number
of states, in their Blue Sky statutes, have incorporated provisions similar to rule lOb-5. See,
e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-472 (West 1981); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 110A, § 101
(Michie/Law. Co-op. 1979); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-52 (West 1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70,
§ 1-401 (Purdon Supp. 1981); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 21.20.010 (1979); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 555.41 (West Special Pamphlet 1981).
147 Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 914 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
148 Id at 916 ("Reliance on the actual 10-K report is an essential prerequisite for a Section 18 action and constructive reliance is not sufficient."); see, e.g., Pearlstein v. Justice Mortgage Investors, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,760, at 94,975 (N.D.
Tex. 1978); Jacobson v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 445 F. Supp. 518, 525 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) ("Plaintiff may only recover if he is able to establish reliance on the actual 10-K form
[or upon] relevant parts of the 10-K forms reported in some other source. . . ."); Barotz v.
94,933, at
Monarch Gen., Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCI)
97,237 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
149 As noted by the district court in Wachovia, it is unclear whether the plaintiff's reliance
must be on the actual document that was filed with the Commission, or whether reliance on a
copy thereof is sufficient. In this regard, the district court stated that the latter "seems to be
the more reasonable position since it is the knowledge that it has been filed with the Commission that justifies reliance on the document." Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 461 F. Supp. 999, 1006 n.13 (D.D.C. 1978), rev'don other grounds, 650 F.2d
342 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
150 The infrequency with which investors read corporate documents is discussed in Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1340, 1359-60 (1966).
151

See 3 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1752 (2d ed. 1961).

152 See, e.g., Jacobson v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 445 F. Supp. 518 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Section 18(a), unlike § 10(b), also
provides that a "court may, in its discretion, require an undertaking for the payment of the
costs of such suit, and assess reasonable costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, against
either party litigant."
153 See notes 111-35 and accompanying text supra. These courts have also relied, in part,
on the rigorous scienter standard required in § 10(b) actions.
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It is critical to consider the likely consequences that would ensue if
courts hold that section 18(a) is the exclusive remedy for false or misleading statements contained in documents filed with the SEC pursuant
to the Exchange Act: With respect to such misconduct, the open market
purchaser or seller would effectively be denied all meaningful redress
under federal law. Such a construction could also provide corporate
malfeasants with the opportunity to insulate their conduct from monetary recompense by including all of their material misrepresentations
and nondisclosures in documents filed with the Commission. 54 In sum,
the ultimate effect of such an exclusive interpretation would be severely
to impair the integrity of the marketplace and investor protection.
Although the Supreme Court has recently taken a more restrictive
view of section 10(b) and perhaps of implied rights of action, 155 the
Court has also shown a concern not to deny a viable remedy to all aggrieved plaintiffs1 56 and to protect ethical business. 157 Viewed from this
perspective, the interests of investors and the financial community are
inextricably intertwined. Exclusivity of the section 18(a) remedy may
induce parties to file fraudulent documents with the SEC that would
not only injure investors, but would also wreak havoc upon the financial
community and perhaps upon the economy as a whole. Taking these
considerations into account, exclusivity of the section 18(a) cause of action "would create a loophole in the statute that Congress simply did
58
not intend to create.'
154 See Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 555-56 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
946 (1980). In such a situation, the Commission may bring an action for injunctive relief
based on violation of § 10(b). Even under an exclusive construction, which extends to only
private litigants, the SEC would be able to invoke the antifraud prohibition of § 10(b), irrespective of whether the false or misleading statement was contained in a filed document.
Also, the Commission could employ § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 in this context. See
also cases cited in note 255 infa. Further, under certain circumstances, aggrieved parties may
obtain monetary recompense indirectly by means of ancillary or other equitable relief procured by the SEC against a subject party. See, e.g., SEC v. Wencke, 622 F.2d 1363, 1369 (9th
Cir. 1980); SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1978);
Chris-Craft Indus., v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 390-91 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 910 (1973); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104-05 (2d Cir.
1972). See general' Farrand,Ancillaq, Remedies in SEC CivilEnforcement Suits, 89 HARV. L. REv.
1779 (1976); Hazen, Administrative Enforcement: An Evaluation of the Securities and Exchange Commissions Use ofInjunctions and Other Enforcement Methods, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 444-51 (1979);
Mathews, Liability of Lawyers Under the Federal Securities Laws, 30 Bus. LAw. 105 (1975); Steinberg, supra note 32. at 32-33. In addition, if the requisite mental state is shown, such misconduct gives rise to criminal liability. See Securities Act of 1933, § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1976);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1976). Also, state remedies may
be available. See note 146 supra.
155 See notes 21-27, 78-86 and accompanying text supra.
156 See notes 94-95 and accompanying text supra
157 See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979). See also United States v. Newman,
[1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,332 (2d Cir. 1981).
158 441 U.S. at 777. An analogy can be drawn to the Court's holding in Nq/)alin that the
protection of § 17(a) of the Securities Act extends to financial intermediaries. There, the
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ComparableProvisions to Section 18(a)

An examination of other provisions where a material misrepresentation or nondisclosure is contained in a document filed with the SEC
that constitutes the basis for the action further demonstrates the illogic
of an exclusive construction of the section 18(a) right of action. 159 Rule
61
14a-9,160 promulgated pursuant to section 14(a) of the Exchange Act,'
for example, prohibits material misrepresentations and omissions in
proxy statements. Because proxy statements are filed with the SEC, the
rationale supporting an exclusive construction of section 18(a) arguably
would bar private damage actions under section 14(a) and rule 14a-9. It
is well established, however, that an implied right of action under these
provisions does exist. 162 As another example, section 14(d), 163 and CoinCourt recognized that a predominant purpose of the Securities Acts was to protect ethical
business. It reasoned that the interests of investors and those of financial intermediaries are
interrelated because frauds perpetrated against either group may ultimately injure the other
and the economy as a whole. Id at 776. Contending that the Na2alin Court's approach was
"sound and firmly rooted in the reality of the operations of the securities markets," this author has concluded previously that "[a]lthough some authorities may fragmentize the operational components of the securities markets and theorize about the applicability of the various
regulatory restrictions to each part, the markets actually operate as a unified whole where
those desiring to buy or sell may do so with confidence." Steinberg, supra note 30, at 170.
Also, a plausible argument can be made that because § 18(a) apparently affords only a
damages remedy, even under an exclusive construction, courts can award the equitable remedy of rescission pursuant to § 10(b). This subject is addressed later in this Article. See notes
240, 273-75 and accompanying text inra.
159 As noted previously, § 18(a) applies only when the document is filed pursuant to the
Exchange Act. See notes 12 & 15 supra. For a discussion of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of
1933, see notes 266-75 and accompanying text infa.
160 Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (1982), provides:
be made by means of any proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting
or other communication, written or oral, containing any statement which, at
the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false
or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any
material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or
misleading or necessary to correct any statement in any earlier communication with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or subject
matter which has become false or misleading.
161
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976). Section 14(a)
provides generally that proxies cannot be solicited "in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
" Section 14(a) applies to all nonexempt securities registered purprotection of investors ..
suant to § 12 of the Exchange Act.
162 See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426 (1964); Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976). For
further discussion on the proxy provisions, see generally E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, PROXY
CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (1968); Ferrara, Starr & Steinberg, Disclosure ofInformation Bearing on Management Integty and Competency, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 555 (1981); Hazen,
CorporateMismanagement and the FederalSecurities ActIs Antifraud tovisions: A FamiliarPath With
Some New Detours, 20 B.C.L. REv. 819, 848-53 (1979); Steinberg, Fiduciar Duties andDisclosure
Obligationsin Proxy and Tender Contestsfor CorporateControl, 30 EMORY LJ. 169, 185-216 (1981).
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1976).
163
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mission rules prescribed thereunder, 16 4 generally require that the offeror
and the target company file documents with the SEC when a tender
offer is made. 65 Subject to certain limitations, 166 material misrepresentations and omissions contained in these documents are actionable
under section 14(e),' 167 the antifraud provision that applies to tender offers. 168 This implied remedy, premised on misleading filings with the
SEC, appears contrary to the spirit of an exclusive construction of section 18(a).
Section 18(a), however, does not extend to the above examples because the section only provides relief to purchasers and sellers. 169 None164 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16,384 (1979), 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-101
(1982).
165 For a discussion of the SEC tender offer rules, see Bloomenthal, The New Tender Ofer
Regimen, State Regulation, and Preemption, 30 EMORY LJ.35, 45-67 (1981); Steinberg, supra note
162, at 219-23.
166 See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (unsuccessful tender offeror
4
does not have standing to bring implied private action for damages under § 1 (e)); Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 658 (1981) (withdrawal of tender offer before plaintiffs could tender their stock precludes private action for
damages under § 14(e)); Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1980) (where no tender
offer was made, plaintiffs could not maintain action for damages under § 14(e) because causation and reliance were absent), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 951 (1980). For a discussion of Chris-Craft,
see Pitt, Standing to Sue Under the Williams Act After Chris-Craft: A Leaky Ship on Troubled Waters,
34 Bus. LAW. 117 (1978). For a discussion of the cases subsequent to Chris-Craft, see Steinberg, supra note 162, at 248-54.
167
15 U.S.C. 78n(e) (1976). Generally, that provision prohibits material misrepresentations or omissions, and any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices in connection with a tender offer.
168 See, e.g., Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1276-78 (5th Cir. 1978),
rev'don other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Spielman
v. General Host Corp., 402 F. Supp. 190, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), af, 538 F.2d 39 (2d Cir.
1976); McCloskey v. Epko Shoes, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 1279, 1281-83 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Petersen v.
Federated Dev. Co., 387 F. Supp. 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Although the Supreme Court has
never ruled on this issue, the analysis and language employed in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982), strongly suggest, if not mandate, that the
Court would recognize such an implied remedy. See 102 S. Ct. at 1846 n.92; notes 2-5 and
accompanying text supra. If a purchase or sale occurs, for example in a consummated exchange offer, plaintiffs may invoke § 10(b) as well. See, e.g., Electronic Speciality Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 940 (2d Cir. 1969). For further discussion on tender
offers, see generally E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER
OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (1977); Easterbrook & Fischel, The ProperRole ofa Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV.L. REV. 1161 (1981); Lynch & Steinberg,
The Legitimaqy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Ofers, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (1979); Steinberg,
supra note 162, at 216-62.
169
See note 12 supra. Consummation of a tender offer, subject to the antifraud provision
of§ 14(e), or a merger, subject to the proxy provision of§ 14(a), may involve the purchase or
sale of a security. See Credit & Fin. Corp. v. Warner & Swasey Co., [1981 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,826 (2d Cir. Jan. 19, 1981) (allegations by arbitraguers that
target company management issued a false press release in connection with a tender offer,
coupled with other factual allegations, were sufficient to state a claim under rule lOb-5). A
purchase or sale, however, does not deny an implied right of action to the aggrieved litigant
under the applicable provisions, even under an exclusive construction. Congress enacted
these provisions to alleviate certain deficiencies unrelated to the purchase or sale of securities.
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theless, these examples illustrate the incongruity of an exclusive
construction of section 18(a). There is no justifiable reason in this context why courts should single out section 10(b) from the other implied
causes of action that have been recognized under comparable provisions, particularly in view of section 10(b)'s special status within the
fabric of the federal securities laws.' ° That a misrepresentation contained in a filed document related to a purchase or sale, rather than a
proxy solicitation or a tender offer, does not justify denying relief to aggrieved investors. Indeed, if courts were to extend exclusivity under section 18(a) to such provisions as sections 14(a) and 14(e), they would also
deprive shareholders of a meaningful remedy. Because Congress clearly
did not intend this result, a coherent construction of the Exchange Act
demands that open-market purchasers and sellers receive a cumulative
construction of section 10(b).
C.

Section 10(b) and Section 12(2)

Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933171 generally imposes liability on any person who offers or sells a security by means of a prospectus or oral communication that includes a material misrepresentation or
nondisclosure. The defendant may avoid liability if he proves that he
did not know and that by exercising reasonable care could not have
known of the misrepresentation or omission. 72 The question that arises
is whether a plaintiff may sue under section 10(b) even though section
12(2) is available.
Unlike section 10(b), section 12(2) under a remedial construction
may be properly viewed as a "legislative oak" rather than a "judicial
acorn."' 7 3 If construed accordingly, section 12(2) extends liability to
See Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 778 (3d Cir. 1976) ("[U]nlike sections 10(b) and 18 of the [Exchange] Act, which encompass activity in numerous and diverse
areas of securities markets and corporate management, section 14(a) is specially limited to
materials used in soliciting proxies.").
170 See notes 159-68 and accompanying text supra.
171 15 U.S.C. § 77/(2) (1976). For the complete text of § 12(2), see note 128 supra.
172 See Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222, 1228 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1005 (1981); Wigand v. Flo-Tek, Inc., 609 F.2d 1028, 1034 (2d Cir. 1980). In Sanders,
the Seventh Circuit discussed the underwriter's duty of care under § 12(2) in connection with
an unregistered offering. The court held the underwriting firm liable for failing to make a
reasonable investigation. The court stated, however, that "[s]ince what constitutes reasonable
care under § 12(2) depends upon the circumstances, we, of course, do not intimate that the
duty of a seller under § 12(2) is always the same as that of an underwriter in a registration
offering under § 11." 619 F.2d at 1228. Justice Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented from the denial of certiorari and expressed concern that the Seventh Circuit decision
would "be read as recognizing no distinction between the standards of care applicable under
§§ 11 and 12(2), and particularly as casting doubt upon the reasonableness of relying upon
the expertise of certified public accountants." 450 U.S. at 1011 (Powell, J., dissenting); see
Greene, supra note 16, at 778-8 1; Comment, 'Reasonable Care" in Section 12(2) of the Securities
Act of 1933, 48 U. Cli. L. REv. 372 (1981).
173 Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) ("When we
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those persons integrally connected with, or substantially involved in, the
offer or sale,' 74 permits aider and abettor liability principles to be applied, 175 and encompasses oral communications made in the
aftermarket. 176 Because the defendant must demonstrate that he was

not negligent and because rescission or damages are available alternative remedies, section 12(2) may be a potent weapon in the plaintiff's
arsenal.
A number of courts, however, have strictly construed section 12(2),
requiring privity between the purchaser and the seller. 177 Under this
restrictive interpretation, section 12(2) frequently provides little solace
to aggrieved claimants. Therefore, if courts give section 12(2) an exclusive construction, that construction should extend only to those purchasers who could invoke section 12(2), and only to those situations where
the provision would apply. 178 For example, courts adopting exclusivity
should recognize the section 10(b) claim if they require privity for a section 12(2) action and privity does not exist. Similarly, if section 12(2)
applies only to the initial distribution process, then section 10(b) should
provide a remedy for misleading oral communications made in the
79
aftermarket.1
deal with private actions under Rule lOb-5, we deal with ajudicial oak which has grown from
little more than a legislative acorn.').
174 See, e.g., Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349, 1360 (5th Cir. 1981); Stokes v. Lokken, 644
F.2d 779, 785 (8th Cir. 1981); Croy v. Campbell, 624 F.2d 709, 714 (5th Cir. 1980); Pharo v.
Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 667 (5th Cir. 1980); Wasson v. SEC, 558 F.2d 879, 886 (8th Cir. 1977);
Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617, 621 (5th Cir. 1973); Hagert v. Glickman, Lurie, Eigor
& Co., 520 F. Supp. 1028, 1035-36 (D. Minn. 1981); In re North Am. Acceptance Corp., [1981
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,961 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Westlake v. Abrams,
504 F. Supp. 337 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Mendelsohn v. Capital Underwriters, Inc., 490 F. Supp.
1069, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
175 See, e.g., Vogel v. Trahan, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
97,303, at 97,082-83 (E.D. Pa. 1980); DeBruin v. Andromeda Broadcasting Sys., 465 F.
Supp. 1276, 1280 (D. Nev. 1979); In re Caesar's Palace Sec. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 366, 378-83
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). See also Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110, 113-14 (3d Cir. 1979).
176 See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 127 F. Supp. 55, 58-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). See aso Hazen, A
Look Beond the Pruning of Rule 1Ob-.- Implied Remedies and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of
1933, 64 VA. L. REV. 641, 644 n.15 (1978) (contending that § 12(2) provides broad antifraud
remedy, unrelated to registration requirements, that will become useful weapon for litigants
in light of Supreme Court's decision in Hochfelder limiting private cause of action based on
§ 10(b) and rule lOb-5); Steinberg, supra note 30, at 180 ("Nothing in [Section 12(2)] specifically limits the prohibition of such 'oral communications' to those occuring only during the
initial distribution.").
177 See, e.g., Benoay v. Decker, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,235 (E.D. Mich. 1981); In re Itel Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 104 (N.D. Cal. 1981); McFarland
v. Memorex Corp., 493 F. Supp. 631, 647-48 (N.D. Cal. 1980). See generaloy Kaminsky, An
Anal'ysis of Securities Litigation Under Section 12(2) and How It Compares With Rule Ob-5, 13
Hous. L. REv. 231 (1976); Rapp, Expanded Liabili Under Section 12 ofthe SecuritiesAct: When
Is a Seller Not a Seller?, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 445, 447 n. 13 (1977).
178 See note 191 infia.
179
In United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979), the Supreme Court held that
§ 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(l) (1976), applied to aftermarket trading frauds. In so holding, however, the Court characterized § 17(a) as a "major departure"
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The section 10(b) remedy should be available to aggrieved litigants
in any event. Section 10(b), unlike section 12(2), is a broad antifraud
provision that requires the plaintiff to show reliance and scienter to prevail. 180 These requirements thereby offset section 12(2)'s shorter statute
of limitations.' 8 1 As stated by one court, "[i]t appears doubtful that
Congress intended victims of intentional fraud to be limited to the negligence remedy provided by § 12(2)."182 Moreover, the plaintiff's burden
of proving scienter under section 10(b) is significantly more difficult
than requiring that the defendant prove his lack of negligence under
section 12(2); as a result, the cumulative approach would not enable a
court to find an implied cause of action that is significantly broader than
183
the one Congress expressly provided.
D. Section 10(b) and Section 11
Whether a section 10(b) remedy should be available to a plaintiff
who acquires a security, issued pursuant to a registration statement that
contains a material misrepresentation or omission, presents a far more
troublesome question. Unlike section 12(2), section 11 specifies the persons who can be sued and expressly restricts liability to those material
18 4
misstatements or omissions contained in the registration statement.
from the Securities Act's framework of regulating initial offerings. 441 U.S. at 778. Based on
the Naialin Court's language and § 12(2)'s position in the Securities Act, it is arguable that
the provision applies only to the initial distribution process. Such a construction, however,
would be contrary to the plain language of the statute and the weight of judicial and scholarly authority. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 127 F. Supp. 55, 58-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Hazen, supra
note 176, at 644 n. 15; Steinberg, supra note 30, at 180; note 176 supra. See also Wachovia Bank
& Trust Co. v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 650 F.2d 342, 357 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 954 (1981) ("Even if we were inclined to hold that the express remedies were intended to be exclusive, they should only preclude implied causes of action in those cases in
which they truly constitute 'remedies."); note 191 infra.
180 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 208-10 (1976); Affiliated Ute Citizens
v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). Reliance need not be proved under § 12(2). See R.
JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 138, at 778. Under § 1C(b), although the plaintiff ordinarily must show reliance, in some circumstances this requirement is relaxed. See 406 U.S. at
153; Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 356 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. granted sub noa., 102 S. Ct. 3481
(1982)). See also note 23 supra;notes 246-48 infia. Cf.Steinberg,supra note 30, at 178 ("Unlike
section 12(2), in which negligent misconduct not constituting fraud or deception is sufficient
to impose liablity for negligent, material misstatements or omissions in the offer or sale of
securities, section 17(a) is primarily directed against fraudulent schemes and practices
181 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 208-09 (1976). In holding that scienter
must be proved in a § 10(b) private damage action, the Court emphasized that "each of the
express civil remedies in the 1933 Act allowing recovery for negligent conduct. . . is subject
to significant procedural restrictions not applicable under § 10(b)." See also note 110 supra.
182 Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 461 F. Supp. 999, 1006
(D.D.C. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 650 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954
(1981).
183 See notes 69-81 and accompanying text supra.
184 For the complete text of§ 11, see note 103 supra. See also R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH,
supra note 138, at 862-63.
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Accordingly, to imply a section 10(b) remedy in this context arguably
would contravene congressional intent.
In marked contrast to section 10(b), on the other hand, plaintiffs
proceeding under section 11 are not burdened with proving scienter,
causation, damages, and, ordinarily, reliance. 185 Hence, section 1l's
procedural limitations remain fully effective in those situations in which
the claimant seeks redress under that provision either because he cannot
satisfy, or elects not to attempt to meet, section 10(b)'s more onerous
requirements. 1 86 Moreover, section 11, somewhat like section 12(2),
provides for a "due diligence" defense.18 7 Accordingly, it is not directed
primarily at deceptive conduct.' 8 8 Arguably, courts should therefore invoke the antifraud remedy of section 10(b), which requires proof of scienter, 18 9 to fill this apparent void. Indeed, congressional concern with
providing an effective deterrent against deceptive schemes and practices
militates against precluding a section 10(b) remedy. If courts adopted
an exclusive construction, section 1l's shorter statute of limitations' 90
would leave some victims of intentional misconduct without redress. It
is unlikely that Congress intended such a result which, in effect, would
signify that investors purchasing securities pursuant to a registered offering would be accorded less protection against intentional misconduct
than purchasers in an unregistered offering or in the aftermarket. 19 1
Even if section 11 is deemed to be exclusive, such exclusivity should
185

See Securities Act of 1933, § 11 (a), (b)(3), (e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a), (b)(3), (e); R. JEN-

NINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 138, at 757-59, 778; notes 138 & 180 supra.

186 See Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 22, Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 1766
(1982).
187 See, e.g., Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 576-83
(E.D.N.Y. 1971); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Folk,
supra note 141. See also Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1005 (1981); note 128 supra.
188 See Greene, supra note 16, at 768 ("The defense of reasonable investigation and belief
was included in section 11 to protect persons, other than the issuer, from liability for material
misstatements or omissions which might occur despite their careful investigation of the
issue.").

189 See note 181 supira.
190 See note 110 supra.
191 Under an exclusive construction, it may be argued that, because § 12(2) applies to
unregistered offerings, this statement is erroneous. Section 12(2), however, applies only to the
making of material misrepresentations and nondisclosures pursuant to a prospectus or oral
communication. Fraud or deception may be perpetrated by other means. In these situations,
§ 10(b) would apply. See notes 178-79 and accompanying text supra. See also Wachovia Bank
& Trust Co. v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 461 F. Supp. 999, 1006 (D.D.C. 1978), rev'don
other grounds, 650 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
A somewhat related liability issue is raised by the integrated disclosure system in which
for certain issuers 1934 Act reports can be incorporated by reference into the registration
statement. See Securities Act Release Nos. 6383-85 (Mar. 3, 1982). Such incorporation of
Exchange Act reports may make it more onerous for parties subject to the Act to satisfy § 1 's
"due diligence" obligations, thus resulting in greater exposure to liability for, among others,
directors, underwriters, and accountants. See Hovdesven & Wolfram, UnderwriterLiability in
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only extend to those persons who are within the provision's scope. For
example, purchasers who acquire securities that are not part of an ongo19 2
Simiing public offering should be entitled to invoke section 10(b).
larly, courts should permit aggrieved purchasers to bring section 10(b)
claims against persons who allegedly rendered substantial assistance in
the making of material misrepresentations or omissions contained in the
registration statement, but who are neither controlling persons nor specifically listed in section 11 as subject to suit. 19 3 This construction of
section 11 is wholly consistent with the legislative scheme. It merely
ensures that purchasers who would otherwise be unable to bring a section 11 action, or could not bring such an action against certain defendants, have a viable remedy.
E.

Section 10(b) and Section 9

The question whether an implied right of action for damages exists
under section 10(b) when the alleged conduct comes within the coverage
of section 9 of the Exchange Act' 94 merits a different analytical framethe Integrated.Disc/osureSystem, Nat'l L.J., July 5, 1982, at 13. See also notes 260-61 and accompanying text infra.
192 See also Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 650 F.2d 342
(D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d
783 (2d Cir. 1951); notes 104. & 178 supra.
193
Section 15 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976), renders one liable who controls any person jointly and severally liable under § 11 or § 12 of the Securities Act. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.405(0 (1982), defines "control" as "the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to
"
direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person ....
Another example of a situation that is not within § 1 's scope is when an expert, such as
an accountant, is sued for fraudulent misconduct for those portions of the registration statement which he did not "expertise." In this situation, as well as in the textual example, liability is premised on an aider and abettor rationale. As a general proposition, the elements
necessary to establish aider and abettor liability are: (1) that the primary party committed a
securities law violation, (2) that the accused aider and abettor was generally aware that his
role was part of an improper activity, and (3) that the accused aider and abettor knowingly
and substantially assisted the principal violation. See ITT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d
Cir. 1980); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47-48 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1039 (1978); Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 94-97 (5th Cir. 1975);
Seiffer v. Topsy's Int'l, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 653, 667-69 (D. Kan. 1980). See a/so Decker v. SEC,
631 F.2d 1380 (10th Cir. 1980); Investors Research Corp. v. SEC, 628 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
194
15 U.S.C. § 78i (1976). The two most relevant subsections for purposes here are
§§ 9(a) and 9(e). They provide:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange, or for any member of a national
securities exchange(1) For the purpose of creating a false or misleading appearance of active
trading in any security registered on a national securities exchange, or a false
or misleading appearance with respect to the market for any such security,
(A) to effect any transaction in such security which involves no change in the
beneficial ownership thereof, or (B) to enter an order or orders for the
purchase of such security with the knowledge that an order or orders of sub-
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work. Unlike sections 11 and 12(2) of the Securities Act and section
18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 195 section 9 requires that the plainstantially the same size, at substantially the same time and at substantially the
same price, for the sale of any such security, has been or will be entered by or
for the same or different parties, or (C) to enter any order or orders for the sale
of any such security with the knowledge that an order or orders of substantially the same size, at substantially the same time, and at substantially the
same price, for the purchase of such security, has been or will be entered by or
for the same or different parties.
(2) To effect, alone or with one or more other persons, a series of transactions in any security registered on a national securities exchange creating actual or apparent active trading in such security or raising or depressing the
price of such security, for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such
security by others.
(3) If a dealer or broker, or other person selling or offering for sale or
purchasing or offering to purchase the security, to induce the purchase or sale
of any security registered on a national securities exchange by the circulation
or dissemination in the ordinary course of business of information to the effect
that the price of any such security will or is likely to rise or fall because of
market operations of any one or more persons conducted for the purpose of
raising or depressing the prices of such security.
(4) If a dealer or broker, or other person selling or offering for sale or
purchasing or offering to purchase the security, to make, regarding any security registered on a national securities exchange, for the purpose of inducing
the purchase or sale of such security, any statement which was at the time and
in the light of the circumstances under which it was made, false or misleading
with respect to any material fact, and which he knew or had reasonable
ground to believe was so false or misleading.
(5) For a consideration, received directly or indirectly from a dealer or
broker, or other person selling or offering for sale or purchasing or offering to
purchase the security, to induce the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange by the circulation or dissemination of information to the effect that the price of any such security will or is likely to rise
or fall because of the market operations of any one or more persons conducted
for the purpose of raising or depressing the price of such security.
(6) To effect either alone or with one or more other persons any series of
transactions for the purchase and/or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange for the purpose of pegging, fixing, or stabilizing the
price of such security in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors.

195

(e) Any person who willfully participates in any act or transaction in
violation of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section, shall be liable to any
person who shall purchase or sell any security at a price which was affected by
such act or transaction, and the person so injured may sue in law or in equity
in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover the damages sustained as a
result of any such act or transaction. In any such suit the court may, in its
discretion, require an undertaking for the payment of the costs of such suit,
and assess reasonable costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, against either
party litigant. Every person who becomes liable to make any payment under
this subsection may recover contribution as in cases of contract from any person who, if joined in the original suit, would have been liable to make the
same payment. No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created
under this section, unless brought within one year after the discovery of the
facts constituting the violation and within three years after such violation.
See notes 138, 180, 185 and accompanying text supra.
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tiff prove that the defendant acted with scienter in order to recover.' 96
197
Section 9, moreover, imposes additional burdens upon the plaintiff.
Due to the scope of the section 9 requirements, there are apprently no
additional elements that a plaintiff must prove to recover under section
10(b). 198

Despite section 10(b)'s lack of a "trade-off" that would impose a
more stringent burden of proof on the plaintiff, the few courts that have
confronted this issue generally have adopted a cumulative approach.199
This rationale, however, was recently rejected by the Fifth Circuit in
Cheme/ron Corp. v. Business Funds, Inc.2 00 In holding that section 9 was the
exclusive remedy, the court reasoned that the scienter, causation, and
reliance requirements were all more stringent under section 9 than
under section 10(b). 201 More specifically, the court held that while
"recklessness" 20 2 has been held to satisfy section 10(b)'s scienter requirement,20 3 such proof of recklessness does not suffice for section 9.2o4 Further, section 9(a) imposes a distinct and more specific standard, an
196 For the text of subsections (a) and (e) of § 9, see note 194 supra.
197 For example, unlike § 11, § 9 requires the plaintiff to prove scienter, causation, reliance, and damages. Unlike § 12(2), a plaintiff proceeding under § 9 must prove scienter and
reliance. See notes 138, 180, 185 and accompanying text Supra. Moreover, plaintiffs seeking
to invoke § 9 are subject to substantial procedural limitations:
Section 9(e) contains a relatively short statute of limitations, permits the court
to require security for costs, limits damages to losses sustained by reason of the
unlawful price manipulation, provides for contribution by persons not joined
as defendants in the original action, and permits the court to assess attorneys'
fees against either party.
Wolgin v. Magic Marker Corp., 82 F.R.D. 168, 180 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
198 See notes 138, 180, 185, 197 and accompanying text supra.
199 See, e.g., Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 555-56 (2d Cir. 1979) (by implication), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 911 (1980); Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank of Lincolnwood, 509 F.2d
1287, 1291-93 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg.
Co., 188 F.2d 783, 788 (2d Cir. 1951) (dicta); Wolgin v. Magic Marker Corp., 82 F.R.D. 168,
179-81 (E.D. Pa. 1979); cf. United States v. Charney, 537 F.2d 341, 351 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1000 (1976). Butsee Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds, Inc., 682 F.2d 1149, 115863 (5th Cir. 1982); Amdur v. Lizars, 39 F.R.D. 29, 36 n.13 (D. Md. 1965) (dicta), at'd, 372
F.2d 103 (4th Cir. 1967).
200 682 F.2d 1149, 1158-63 (5th Cir. 1982).
201 Id. at 93,959.
202 Courts have applied at least four different definitions of recklessness. See Steinberg &
Gruenbaum, supra note 22, at 191-208.
203 682 F.2d 1149, 1161 n.15 (5th Cir. 1982). For such holdings, see, e.g., Mansbach v.
Prescott Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1023-25 (6th Cir. 1979); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d
1332, 1337 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co.,
570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); First Va. Bankshares v. Benson,
559 F.2d 1307, 1314 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun
Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1039-40 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977). The
Supreme Court has expressly left this issue open for both private and SEC actions. Aaron v.
SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 686 n.5 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 19-94 n.12
(1976).
204 682 F.2d at 1162. But see note 211 infta.
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"intent to induce" a purchase or sale of the subject security. 20 5 Moreover, whereas section 10(b) requires only that the material misrepresentation or nondisclosure "touch" upon the reasons for the security's
change in value, 20 6 section 9(a), construed in conjunction with section
9(e), requires that such conduct "affect" the price at which the plaintiff
purchased or sold the subject security.20 7 Last, the court asserted that,
unlike section 10(b) where reliance can sometimes be presumed, 20 8 section 9 requires actual reliance in all instances. 20 9 Taking these considerations into account, the court found that "permitting a Rule 10b-5
remedy here would impermissibly nullify the section 9 remedy .... 1210
While the court's assertion that section 9's scienter and reliance requirements are stricter than their counterparts under section 10(b) is
subject to debate, 21 1 it is correct in concluding that the implied right of
action under section 10(b) does not require the plaintiff to undertake
any burdens additional to those he would face under section 9's express
remedy. On the surface, therefore, the court's analysis appears sound.
Upon further reflection, however, the conclusion is inescapably reached
that this approach not only leads to absurd results 21 2 but, even more
importantly, is a dangerous assault upon the integrity of the
marketplace.
For example, under the court's analysis, one who engages in stock
manipulation that fails to "affect" the price at which the plaintiff
purchased or sold the subject security may entirely avoid private liability even though such misconduct "touched" upon the reasons for the
205 Id. For the language of § 9(a), see note 194 supra.
206 See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971).
207 682 F.2d at 1162 & n.21. For the language at subsections (a) and (e) of § 9, see note
194 supra.
208 See Affliiated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972); Panzirer v.
Wolf, 663 F.2d 365, 368 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. grantedsub noma., Price Waterhouse v. Panzirer,
102 S. Ct. 3481 (1982). Such a presumption of reliance is rebuttable. See Keirnan v. Homeland, Inc., 611 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1980). Seegeneraly notes 246-53 and accompanying
text infra.
209 682 F.2d at 1162 n.20.
210 Id. at 1169. For further support, the court also referred to the procedural limitations
that are present under § 9 but not under § 10(b). Id. at 1163 n.24; see note 198 supra. See note
198 supra. In addition, the court relied on its interpretation of the Exchange Act's legislative
history. 682 F.2d at 1194.
211 For example, § 9(a)(4) proscribes materially false or misleading statements which the
defendant knew or "had reasonable ground to believe was so false or misleading." Section
9(e) imposes liability upon any person who, inter alia, "willfully" engages in the proscribed
acts or transactions enumerated in subsections (a), (b), and (c) of § 9. The above language
arguably encompasses reckless as well as intentional misconduct. See Steinberg &
Gruenbaum, supra note 22, at 191-210. Further, courts may conclude that in appropriate
circumstances reliance may be presumed under § 9(a). See generall' cases cited in note 208
supra.
212 See 682 F.2d at 1194 (Williams, J., dissenting in part) ("The difficulty I have with
[the majority's opinion] is that it leads to a result which borders on the absurd.").
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security's change in value.2 13 Moreover, because section 9(a) (2) requires
a series of transactions to take place in order to constitute a violation,
while section 10(b) requires only one such transaction, the court's rationale implies that a defendant would be liable under section 10(b) for a
single transaction but would avoid monetary liability for a series of
transactions unless the plaintiff satisfies section 9(a)(2)'s more stringent
requirements. 2 14 Such a rationale clearly makes little sense. To reconcile the court's seemingly expansive language with the realities of the
marketplace and congressional intent, its holding should be limited to
those situations where relief would have been clearly available under
section 9 but the plaintiff proceeded under section 10(b). This would
occur, for instance, where the plaintiff, seeking to preserve the vitality of
his cause of action, attempts to invoke section 10(b) after section 9(e)'s
2 15
shorter statute of limitations had run.
Moreover, the clearest and most persuasive reason why the panel's
decision in Chemetron is misplaced is that it affords less protection to investors who trade on a national securities exchange than to those who
trade in the over-the-counter market. It is beyond dispute that section 9
applies by its terms only to transactions on a national securities exchange. 2 16 To fill this vacuum, courts have uniformly held that such
In this regard, one who engages in such stock manipulation will arguably be subject
213
to § 10(b) liability in both SEC and criminal actions. Unlike private actions for damages,
government proceedings should not be subject to the exclusivity rationale. See SEC v. Falstaff
Brewing Corp., 629 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Kalmanovitz v. SEC, 449 U.S.
1012 (1980).
214
See 682 F.2d at 1195 (Williams, J., dissenting in part). In his dissenting opinion,
Judge Williams asserted that "[t]he compelling irony in this case is that the majority view
results in freeing the more serious offender but holding the lesser offender liable for engaging
in exactly the same activities, manipulative and fraudulent devices in securities transactions."
Id. at 1197. Although there is considerable logic to such an assertion, it arguably extends
only to private suits for monetary damages. Such offenders still should be subject to SEC and
criminal actions under § 10(b). See notes 154 & 213 supra and note 255 infra. Moreover, it is
well settled that in appropriate circumstances the Commission may obtain other equitable
relief, including the disgorgement of profits illegally procured. See, e.g., SEC v. Wencke, 622
F.2d 1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 1980); SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 10203 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104-05 (2d Cir.
1972); authorities cited in note 154 supra.
215 Under § 9(e), suits must be "brought within one year after the discovery of the facts
constituting the violation and within three years after such violation." On the other hand, no
express limitations period exists in the Exchange Act for actions brought under § 10(b). The
courts thus have applied the state statute of limitations applicable to comparable state actions. See, e.g., Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870, 874-75 (10th Cir. 1982) (Utah three-year
statute of limitations for fraud applied); White v. Sanders, 650 F.2d 627, 629 (5th Cir. 1981)
(two-year statute of limitations period of Alabama Blue Sky law applied); Carothers v. Rice,
633 F.2d 7, 12 (6th Cir. 1980) (three-year statute of limitations period of Kentucky Blue Sky
law applied).
216
For the language of § 9(a), see note 194 supra. See also Chemetron Corp. v. Business
Funds, Inc., 682 F.2d at 1159-60 nn.12-14 (5th Cir. 1982); Wolgin v. Magic Marker Corp., 82
F.R.D. 168, 179 (E.D. Pa. 1979); SEC v. Resch-Cassin & Co., 362 F. Supp. 964, 975 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
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manipulative practices that occur in the over-the-counter market may
be redressed by private claimants under section 10(b).2 17 Because these
claimants are not saddled with the limitations of section 9, they may
successfully seek redress in situations in which injured investors who
trade on a national securities exchange under the Chemetron rationale
would be denied recovery.
Such a result is not only misplaced but is contrary to congressional
intent. The Securities Acts Amendments of 1964218 were the ultimate
result of a congressionally-mandated special study conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission. 219 The study recommended, inter
alia, that Congress strengthen over-the-counter regulation. 220 Congress
followed this recommendation in order to provide, as much as practicable, equality of regulation between the national securities exchange and
over-the-counter markets. 2 21 At no time, however, did Congress intend
to create greater rights on behalf of over-the-counter investors as com22 2
pared to those given to investors who trade in listed securities.
Congress' approach is sound and firmly rooted in the reality of the
operations of the securities markets. In contrast, the Chemetron panel's
holding fragmentizes the operational components of the securities markets and ignores that the markets operate as a unified whole where those
desiring to buy or sell may do so with confidence. Denying private parties the use of section 10(b) with respect to manipulative schemes in
listed securities would insulate from monetary liability practices repugnant to the notions of honesty and fairness. Such a construction goes far
toward undermining the very interests the securities laws were designed
217 See, e.g., Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Mktg. Co., 650 F.2d 342
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (by implication), cerL. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); Huddleston v. Herman &
MacLean, 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981) (by implication), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 1766 (1982);
Wolgin v. Magic Marker Corp., 82 F.R.D. 168, 179 (E.D. Pa. 1979). See a/so R. JENNINGS &
H. MARSH, supra note 138, at 775 (Section 9 is "limited to listed securities and does not
prohibit similar actions in the over-the-counter market, although it would seem that Rule
lOb-5, even after its recent paring back by the Supreme Court, would clearly cover similar
activity in the over-the-counter market to that described in Section 9.").
218 Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565.
219

REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND Ex-

CHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., IstSess. (1963).

220 Id. pt. 3, at 62-64.
221 Thus, prior to the 1964 amendments, the registration (§ 12), periodic reporting (§ 13),
proxy (§ 14), and recapture of short-swing profits (§ 16) provisions of the Exchange Act applied only to corporations that had securities listed on a national securities exchange. The
1964 amendments "extended their application to certain publicly-held corporations [meeting
defined asset and shareholder requirements] whose securities are traded over-the-counter."
R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 138, at 441.
222 See id. at 441-44, (quoting Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7425 (Sept. 15, 1964));
Cohen, supra note 150, at 1341 ("[T]hrough the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, the
1934 Act's pattern of continuous disclosure was made applicable to a much larger category of
issuers-all those presumed to be the subject of active investor interest in the over-the-counter
market. .
").
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2 23

to promote.

F. Reporting Provisions of the Exchange Act and Section 18(a)
Certain provisions of the Securities Exchange Act subject issuers
224
and other persons to affirmative reporting or disclosure obligations.
Section 13(a), for example, requires applicable issuers to file periodic
reports with the Commission. 225 Section 13(d) generally requires any
person or group of persons, who acquires more than five percent of a
class of equity securities registered under section 12 of the Act, 22 6 to disclose certain specific information within ten days by filing a Schedule
13D 227 with the SEC and by sending copies to the issuer and to each
223 Generally, two other arguments have been advanced for a cumulative construction of
the federal securities laws. One is based on § 16 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1976),
and § 28 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976), which both state that
the rights and remedies provided in the respective acts "shall be in addition to any and all
other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity." See Brief for the Securities and
Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae, at 15, Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640
F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 1766 (1982). The second is based on the
proposition that a "no-overlap" rule would be particularly difficult to administer. As stated
by one court:
Such a rule would require the court in every section 10(b) or Rule lOb-5 case
to determine, on a pretrialmotion, whether the wrongs alleged in the complaint
could arguably give rise to liability under one of the express civil remedies of
the 1933 Act or the 1934 Act. This determination would often turn on the
precise facts of a given case, so that the court might be unable to act until
discovery was completed. Too, this pretrial determination might raise difficult legal issues regarding the applicability of a particular express remedy.
Wolgin v. Magic Marker Corp., 82 F.R.D. 168, 180 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
224 See notes 225-27 and accompanying text infra. In certain circumstances, § 10(b) and
other antifraud provisions, even in the absence of prior inaccurate disclosures, may impose an
affirmative duty to disclose. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Financial
Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1973); State Teachers
Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 500 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), af'dinpart,reo'dinpart,654
F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1981); Bauman, Rule lOb-5 and the Corporation'sAjitnative Duty to Disclose, 67
GEo. L.J. 935 (1979); Steinberg, supra note 162, at 216-19; Vaughn, Timing of Disclosure, 13
REV. SEC. REG. 911 (1980); Note, Disclosure of AlaterialInside Information: An Atirmative Corporate Duty?, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 795.
225
15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1976).
226 Id. § 78m(d). Generally, § 12, and Commission rules thereunder, subject companies
whose stock is traded on a national stock exchange (§ 12(b)), or that have total assets in excess
of $3 million and more than 500 shareholders of record of a class of equity security (§ 12(g) as
modified by SEC Rule 12g-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (1982)) to the periodic reporting requirements of§ 13. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 18647 (Apr. 15, 1982), repnntedin 14
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 701 (Apr. 23, 1982).
227 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d (1982).
Schedule 13D requires disclosure of the identity of the issuer and the security,
the identity, background, and citizenship of the reporting persons, the source
and amount of funds used to acquire the securities, the purpose of the transaction, the reporting person's interest in the securities including trading history
for the last 60 days and any contracts, arrangements, understandings or relationships with respect to the securities to which the reporting person or group
is a party.
Bialkin, Attura & D'Alimonte, Why, When and How to Conduct a Proxy Battlefor CorporateControl,
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exchange on which the security is traded. 2 28
The question arises whether the courts should recognize an implied
right of action for damages under these provisions in view of the express
remedy provided by section 18(a). Most courts have correctly adopted
an exclusive construction of section 18(a) in this context. 229 Under the
modified Cori standards that Redington applied, 230 the relevant provisions, namely section 13(a) and section 13(d), neither create identifiable
rights in any party nor proscribe any conduct as being unlawful, and
their legislative history is silent or ambiguous on the existence of an implied action for damages. 23 ' According to Redngton, therefore, the
in PROXY CONTESTS AND BATTLES FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 87, 117 (Practicing Law
Institute 1981).
228 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976). The Second Circuit stated that "[t]he goal of§ 13(d) 'is
to alert the marketplace to every large, rapid aggregation or accumulation of securities...
which might represent a potential shift in corporate control."' Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp.,
638 F.2d 357, 380 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972)). In this regard, it is clear that § 13(d) is a disclosure
statute. The District of Columbia Circuit has observed: "[I]t is plain that Section 13(d) requires the making of a completely truthful statement." SEC v. Savoy Indus., 587 F.2d 1149,
1165 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 913 (1979). See also Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun
Chem. Corp., 611 F.2d 240, 246-47 (8th Cir. 1979) (§ 13(d) requires disclosure of "purpose" to
acquire control even if no fixed plan exists). However, in Judge Gesell's view, such disclosure
does not extend to indefinite or tentative plans. Hence, "[i]n judging the adequacy of a
Schedule 13D statement, fair accuracy, not perfection, is the appropriate standard." Purolator, Inc. v. Tiger Int'l, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 554, 556 (D.D.C. 1981). Moreover, as the Fifth
Circuit stated:
The person or corporation filing a Schedule 13D statement need not necessarily walk a tortuous path. He must, of course, be precise and forthright in
making full and fair disclosure as to all material facts called for by the various
items of the schedule. At the same time he must be careful not to delineate
extravagantly or to enlarge beyond reasonable bounds. . . .Though the offeror has an obligation fairly to disclose its plans in the event of a takeover, it
is not required to make predictions of future behavior, however tentatively
phrased, which may cause the offeree or the public investor to rely on them
unjustifiably.
Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan Am. Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075, 1085-86 (5th Cir. 1970). See also
Jewelcor Inc. v. Pearlman, 397 F. Supp. 221, 237-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
229 See, e.g., Phillips v. TPC Communications, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1981);
Schnell v. Schnell, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,927, at 90,715-16
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Berman v. Metzger, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,857 (D.D.C. 1981); Stromfeld v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 484 F. Supp. 1264, 1268
(S.D.N.Y.), afd, 646 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1980); Lewis v. Elam, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,103 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Comment, PrivateRights ofAction for Damages UnderSection 13(d), 32 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1980). See a/so Spencer Cos. v. Agency RentA-Car, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,361 (D. Mass. 1981)
(misleading Schedule 13D filings actionable under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976)).
230 See note 69 and accompanying text supra.
231 This analysis, however, does not apply to certain other reporting or disclosure provisions. For example, § 14(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1976), by its terms, makes failure to
adhere to its disclosure requirements unlawful. Accordingly, courts should apply the Cori
four-prong test in its entirety when determining whether an implied right of action for damages exists under § 14(d). It is arguable, however, that the Supreme Court's analysis in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982), dictates that an
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courts should conclude that Congress did not intend to create a private
damages remedy under these provisions. 23 2 Further, Congress designed
section 13(a) and section 13(d) to require persons or entities subject to
those provisions to provide information to the marketplace so that investors and other relevant parties can react intelligently. 233 Thus, the primary objective of these provisions is to mandate the filing of certain
pertinent information, rather than to provide an antifraud prohibition.
Finally, to authorize an implied remedy for damages under section 13(a)
or 13(d) would indirectly circumvent the purchaser-seller requirement
under section 10(b), 23 4 thereby permitting allegedly aggrieved parties to
bring suit on the theory that they would have purchased, sold, or retained their stock if the filed information had been accurate. Such a
result would raise the possibility of vexatious litigation, the very consequence that the Supreme Court sought to alleviate. 235 In this regard, if
the plaintiff is a purchaser or seller, he has an adequate remedy under
section 10(b), provided that the courts adopt the cumulative construc23 6
tion recommended herein.
The denial of a private right of action for damages under section
13(d) and comparable provisions, however, should not preclude the implication of a private right of action for injunctive relief. Applying the
implied right for damages under the provision should be recognized. Such an argument is
misplaced. Prior to 1975, the courts did not "routinely and consistently" recognize such a
remedy under § .14(d). See generally 102 S. Ct. at 1841; notes 43-98 and accompanying text
supra.

232 See notes 80-81 and accompanying text supra. The Supreme Court's decision in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982), also supports this
conclusion. Prior to 1975, the reporting provisions, unlike § 10(b), were not generally construed to provide implied private rights of action for damages. See GAF Corp. v. Milstein,
453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cerI. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972). See also notes 43-98 and accompanying text supra.
233 See note 228 supra. Section 10(b) and other antifraud provisions may under certain
circumstances require a subject party to affirmatively disclose, even in the absence of prior
inaccurate disclosures. See note 224 supra.
234 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). See also note 21
and accompanying text supra.
235 With respect to strike suits, the Supreme Court stated in Blue Chip:
[I]n the field of federal securities laws governing disclosure of information
even a complaint which by objective standards may have very little chance of
success at trial has a settlement value to the plaintiff out of any proportion to
its prospect of success at trial so long as he may prevent the suit from being
resolved against him by dismissal or summary judgment. The very pendency
of the lawsuit may frustrate or delay normal business activity of the defendant
which is totally unrelated to the lawsuit.
421 U.S. at 740 (citations omitted). Arguably, however, the courts may combat the potential
of vexatious litigation by measures such as requiring plaintiffs to post security for expenses,
requiring judicial review of derivative settlements, and granting summary judgment motions.
A number of states require the posting of security for expenses. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 800(d) (West 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-6(3) (West Supp. 1981); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 627 (McKinney Supp. 1982); MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 49 (1974). See also Haberman
v. Tobin, 626 F.2d 1101 (2d Cir. 1980).
236 See notes 143-93 and accompanying text supra.
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Supreme Court's analysis in Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Curran,2 37 prior to 1975 courts uniformly recognized such implied rights
of action for injunctive relief.238 Moreover, section 13(d) was enacted
thirty-four years after section 18(a) in a "contemporary legal context" in
which courts "regarded the denial of a remedy as the exception rather
than the rule."' 239 Hence, the granting of injunctive relief in this context
would be consistent with the statutory scheme, even when viewed from

an exclusive construction of section 18(a).2 40 Indeed, if the courts deny
an issuer corporation or any other interested party24 ' such a remedy
237 102 S. Ct. 1825, 1839 (1982). For further discussion, see notes 43-68 and accompanying text supra.
238 See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 719-21 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 910 (1972); Bath Indus. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 113 (7th Cir. 1970). As discussed earlier,
the Securities Exchange Act has been amended in significant respects. See notes 56-58 and
accompanying text supra. Accordingly, in the words of Curran, "the fact that a comprehensive
reexamination and significant amendment of the [Exchange Act] left intact the statutory
provisions under which the federal courts had implied a cause of action is itself evidence that
Congress affirmatively intended to preserve that remedy." 102 S. Ct. at 1841.
239 102 S. Ct. at 1837 (relying on Texas & Pac. R.R. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-40
(1916)). Moreover, the 1975 amendments, which left the provisions of § 13(d) unchanged,
constituted Congress' most extensive review of the federal securities laws. See Hearings,supra
note 62, at 1; Pitt, supra note 59, at 22; notes 43-68 and accompanying text supra.
240 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. at 1839-40;
notes 237-39 and accompanying text supra. Moreover, in contests for corporate control, the
stage of preliminary injunctive relief, rather than post-contest proceedings, "is the time when
relief can best be given." Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 42 (1977) (quoting Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 947 (2d Cir. 1969)), cited
with approval in Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981). See also
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 57-65 (1975). Accordingly, the courts must
recognize an action for injunctive relief under § 13(d) if that provision is to fulfill its essential
function-to ensure that accurate material information is available to shareholders and investors before
they make a determination to buy or sell stock in the issuing corporation. See Bath
Indus. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 113 (7th Cir. 1970).
It is possible that an action for injunctive relief is available under § 18(a) since that
provision allows an aggrieved person to sue at law or in equity. For example, in Deckert v.
Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940), the Court, in an action brought under the
Securities Act of 1933, stated:
[The] courts are given jurisdiction "of all suits in equity and actions at law
brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this subchapter." The
power to enforce implies the power to make effective the right of recovery afforded by the Act. And the power to make the right of recovery effective
implies the power to utilize any of the procedures or actions normally available to the litigant according to the exigencies of the particular case.
Id. at 288 (emphasis in original) (quoting Securities Act of 1933, § 22(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77v
(1976)). Similarly, § 27 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976), grants the federal
district courts jurisdiction "to enforce any liability or duty" created by the Act. In this regard, however, even if such a right to injunctive relief may be procured under § 18(a), that
provision expressly requires that the aggrieved party be a purchaser or seller. This requirement fails to address the function that § 13(d) is designed to serve. See discussion in this note
upra.

241 The target company is in the best position to detect violations and to bring suit to
force compliance with § 13(d). See Weeks Dredging & Contracting, Inc. v. American Dredging Co., 451 F. Supp. 468 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Burack, ImpliedRights in Tender O ers, 14 REv. SEC.
REG. 885 (1981); Note, An Implied Right of Action for Issuers Under Section 13(d) ofthe Securities
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under section 13(d), a shift in corporate control may occur without the
knowledge of the marketplace. This result would be antithetical to the
rationale underlying section 13(d).242 Accordingly, the integrity of the
marketplace and investor protection demand that the courts recognize
243
an implied remedy for injunctive relief in this setting.
G. Suggested Construction of Section 18(a)
If the courts ultimately give section 18(a) an exclusive construction,
the interpretation and scope of that provision will become crucial to
aggrieved litigants. Although several courts have construed section 18(a)
as imposing strict standards of causation and reliance,2 44 the courts
could read the provision more flexibly without contravening congressional intent. With respect to the causation and reliance requirements,
the language of the statute provides that a culpable defendant "shall be
liable to any person. . . who, in reliance upon such [materially false or
misleading] statement, shall have purchased or sold a security at a price
which was affected by such statement, for damages caused by such reliance. ....-245 Construed flexibly, the language that creates the reliance
requirement does not demand that the plaintiff actually read the filed
document or a copy thereof.2 46 Indeed, one can argue that investors
generally rely on the assumption that the marketprice of the security has
Exchange Act of 193, 61 B.U.L. REv. 933, 936, 963 n.179 (1981). Mobil Corp. v. Marathon
Oil Corp., 669 F.2d 366, 372 (6th Cir. 1981), is also relevant. In recognizing that the offeror,
Mobil, had a private cause of action for injunctive relief under § 14(e), the Sixth Circuit
stated: "Because of the unique ability of Mobil to act quickly while armed with information
necessary to prove any Section 14(e) violations, this injunctive action may often be the only
means to provide adequate assurance that Marathon's shareholders have a fully informed,
free choice." f Aranow, Einhom & Berlstein, Standing to Sue to Challenge Violations ofthe Williams Act, 32 Bus. LAW. 1755, 1760 (1977) ("It is unrealistic to expect that shareholders of the
target will be able to bring suit seeking to enjoin statements made by the management of
their own company concerning the tender offer.").
242 See notes 240-41 and accompanying text supra.
243 For cases recognizing an implied right of action for injunctive relief on behalf of the
issuer corporation under § 13(d), see, e.g., Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex Ltd., 624 F.2d 1216 (4th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1101 (1981); Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 611
F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1979); General Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556 F.2d 90, 94 n.5 (1st Cir.
1977); GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 719-21 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910
(1972); Kirsch Co. v. Bliss & Laughlin Indus., 495 F. Supp. 488, 490-92 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
But see American Bakeries Co. v. Pro-Met Trading Co., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 97,925 (N.D. Ill.
1981); First Ala. Bancshares, Inc. v. Lowder, [1981 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,015 (N.D. Ala. 1981); Gateway Indus. v. Agency Rent
A Car, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ill. 1980), cited with approvalin Sta-Rite Indus. v. Nortek,
Inc., 494 F. Supp. 358, 361-63 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
244 See notes 143-52 and accompanying text supra.
245 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976). For the complete text of § 18(a), see note 12 supra.
246 See also Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972); Panzirer v.
Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. grantedsub nom. Price Waterhouse v. Panzirer, 102 S.
Ct. 3481 (1982); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc); Blackie v. Barrack,
524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976); Mottoros v. Abrams, 524 F.
Supp. 254 (N.D. Il. 1981); Stem v. Steans, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
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been validly established, and that no unsuspected fraudulent activity,
including materially false or misleading statements, has affected the
price. 247 Even if the courts do not apply this "fraud on the market"
approach in the section 18(a) setting, arguably the provision requires
only that the plaintiff rely on the misleading statement in engaging in
the transaction. A plaintiff may show such reliance without proving
that he read the filed document or a copy thereof. The plaintiff, for
example, may have purchased or sold the security on his broker's recommendation, which was based in turn on an actual reading of the repre(CCH) 1 98,369 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). In Blackie, a leading "fraud on the market" case with respect to § 10(b) and rule 10b-5, the Ninth Circuit stated:
Here, we eliminate the requirement that plaintiffs prove reliance directly
in this context because the requirement imposes an unreasonable and irrelevant evidentiary burden. A purchaser on the stock exchanges may be either
unaware of a specific false representation, or may not directly rely on it; he
may purchase because of a favorable price trend, price earnings ratio, or some
other factor. Nevertheless, he relies generally on the supposition that the market price is validly set and that no unsuspected manipulation has artificially
inflated the price, and thus indirectly on the truth of the representations underlying the stock price-whether he is aware of it or not, the price he pays
reflects material misrepresentations. Requiring direct proof from each purchaser that he relied on a particular representation when purchasing would
defeat recovery by those whose reliance was indirect, despite the fact that the
causational chain is broken only if the purchaser would have purchased the
stock even had he known of the misrepresentation. We decline to leave such
open market purchasers unprotected. The statute and rule are designed to
foster an expectation that securities markets are free from fraud-an expectation on which purchasers should be able to rely.
524 F.2d at 907. The Supreme Court apparently will decide the validity of the "fraud on the
market" theory under § 10(b) this Term. Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
grantedsub noma.
Price Waterhouse v. Panzirer, 102 S. Ct. 3481 (1982). See general Brunelle,
Market Regulations: The Shores Case-Expansionofthe "Fraudon the Market" Doctrine, 9 SEc. REG.
LJ.390 (1982); Crane, An Anaysis of Causation Under Rule lob-5, 9 SEC. REG. UJ. 99 (1981);
Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule 1Ob-5, 88 HARv. L. REv. 584
(1975).
247 See cases cited in note 246 supra. Particularly relevant in this regard is Judge Higginbotham's observation in In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1980), that "reliance
on the market price is conceptually indistinguishable from reliance upon representations
made in face-to-face transactions." Id at 142. Judge Higginbotham stated:
In face-to-face transactions, the inquiry into an investor's reliance upon information is into the subjective pricing of that information by that investor.
With the presence of a market, the market is interposed between seller and
buyer and, ideally, transmits information to the investor in the processed form
of a market price. Thus the market is performing a substantial part of the
valuation process performed by the investor in a face-to-face transaction. The
market is acting as the unpaid agent of the investor, informing him that given
all the information available to it, the value of the stock is worth the market
price...
* * "Recent economic studies tend to buttress empirically the central
assumption of the fraud on the market theory-that the market price reflects
all representations concerning the stock. ...
The fraud on the market theory does not eliminate the element of reliance but places it where in open market transactions it realistically belongsconnecting the purchaser to the market, not the specific misstatement.
Id at 143-44.
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sentation contained in the filed document. Likewise, the plaintiff may
have engaged in the transaction after reading a financial column that
reported on the statements made in the filed document. In both situations, although the plaintiff relied in the first instance on other sources,
his ultimate source of reliance was the statements contained in the
document.

248

Under an alternative approach, even if exclusivity were adopted,
the above examples arguably fall within the fabric of section 10(b) and
not within section 18(a). In other words, the plaintiff in his purchase or
sale actually relied on his broker or the financial article, and not on the
misrepresentations contained in the filed document. 249 Section 18(a),
therefore, does not apply in this context. Liability would be imposed
upon the culpable issuer or other person on either a fraud on the market
rationale250 or on the premise that the defendant, by filing documents
with the Commission, had sufficiently entangled itself with the broker's
or financial columnist's representations so as to induce the misstatements, thereby rendering those representations attributable to it. Because it was reasonably foreseeable that the filed documents would be
reported on and communicated by financial sources, 25 ' courts may con248
Courts have recognized such "indirect" or "third party" reliance under § 10(b). See,
e.g., Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365, 367 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. grantedsubnom. Price Waterhouse
v. Panzirer, 102 S. Ct. 3481 (1982) ("We find no support in the law for the district court's
distinction between primary and secondary reliance."); Walsh v. Butcher & Sherrerd, 452 F.
Supp. 80, 84 (E.D. Pa. 1978) ("While we can find no authority directly discussing the issue of
'third-party reliance,' our understanding of the reliance element reveals that reliance of this
kind cannot be deemed insufficient as a matter of law."); Sullivan v. Chase Inv. Serv. of
Boston, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 246, 271 n.13 (N.D. Cal. 1978) ("If,as allegedly happened with plaintiff Sullivan, a broker defendant distributed the chart not to the client but to a member of the
client's family, the broker would be liable if he knew the chart to be false and expected the
family member to give the chart to the client or to tell the client about the information
contained in the chart."); Entin v. Barg, 60 F.R.D. 108, 112 (E.D. Pa. 1973) ("[I]n a case of
either misrepresentation or nondisclosure, the only direct conscious reliance may be by one in
the business of investment counseling, and the actual buyer or seller may only be relying on
his adviser's expertise or the 'glowing reports' of a successful business engendered by the fraud
leading to an inflated market"; in such situations, § 10(b) does not "require actual reliance on
particular misrepresentations or nondisclosures.'). Cf Douglas & Bates, The Federal 8ecurities
Act of 1933, 43 YALE LJ. 171, 172 (1933) (One effect of the Securities Act is to "plac[e] in the
market during the early stages of the life of a security a body of facts which, operating indirectly through investment services and expert investors, will tend to produce more accurate
appraisal of the worth of the security if it commands a broad enough market.').
249 See authorities cited in note 248 supra.
250 See notes 246-47 and accompanying text supra.
251
As stated by SEC Chairman John S.R. Shad:
Managements often devote a great deal of time to their annual reports; and,
too often, they abdicate their 10-Ks, prospectuses and proxies to counsel.
They may not appreciate that these documents are carefully studied by institutional investors (who account for 70 percent of the listed and 50 percent of
the over-the-counter market), as well as by the bond rating agencies and
others. They have a much greater impact on the market prices of corporate
securities than the letters to the shareholders in annual reports to which top
managements often devote much greater attention.
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clude that the allegedly culpable party had placed its imprimatur on the
statements made by such financial sources. 252 According to this analysis, the plaintiffs reliance on misrepresentations or nondisclosures made
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities gives rise to a valid
claim under section 10(b), even under an exclusive construction of sec253
tion 18(a).
Even if the courts reject the above rationales, 254 they should at least
hold that defendants cannot insulate themselves from section 10(b) liability by making identical misrepresentations or nondisclosures in both
SEC filed documents and in reports and releases that are not so filed. As
to the latter, the section 10(b) cause of action should be available.
Otherwise, malfeasants could publicize false or misleading statements
Schlagman, Shad DelineatesHis Goals As Commission Chairman to Streamline SEC Rules, N.Y.L.J.,

Dec. 14, 1981, at 29, col. 1; id at 50, col. 4.
252
Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365, 367 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. granted sub no. Price
Waterhouse v. Panzirer, 102 S. Ct. 3481 (1982) ("Where the plaintiff acts upon information
from those working in or reporting on the securities markets, and where that information is
circulated after a material misrepresentation or omission plaintiff has stated a sufficient claim
of reliance on the misrepresentation or nondisclosure.'); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646
F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 658 (1981) ("While it is true that there is no duty
upon management or directors to disclose financial projections, . . . it is also axiomatic that
once a company undertakes partial disclosure of such information there is a duty to make the
full disclosure of known facts necessary to avoid making such statements misleading.");
Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980) (In determining whether Liggett
had a duty to correct the investment community's high expectations regarding the company's
earnings once it learned that its own internal forecasts were less optimistic, the court phrased
the pertinent issue as "whether Liggett sufficiently entangled itself with the analysts' forecasts
to render those predictions 'attributable to it' "; after reviewing the relevant facts, the court
absolved Liggett of liability on this basis, concluding that "Liggett did not place its imprimatur, expressly or impliedly, on the analysts' projections." Id at 163); Vaughn v. Teledyne,
Inc., 628 F.2d 1214, 1221 (9th Cir. 1980) ("There is no evidence .. .that the [financial]
estimates were made with such reasonable certainty even to allow them to be disclosed to the
public.') (emphasis in original); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409
F.2d 937, 949 (2d Cir. 1969) (defendant, who was preparing to make tender offer, was under
no duty to correct erroneous factual statements of press not attributable to it).
253 See note 248 supra. In such a situation, the plaintiff must prove scienter on the part of
the issuer corporation or other allegedly culpable party. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 197-214 (1976). Recklessness, however, should suffice. See, e.g., G.A. Thompson &
Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 959-60 (5th Cir. 1981); Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa.,
Inc., 616 F.2d 641, 649 (3d Cir. 1980); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017,
1023-25 (6th Cir. 1979); Edward J. Mawod & Co. v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588, 595-97 (10th Cir.
1979); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978);
First Va. Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1314 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875
(1977); Seiffer v. Topsy's Int'l, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 653, 664-65 (D. Kan. 1980); In re TransOcean Tender Offer Sec. Litig., 455 F. Supp. 999, 1009-10 (N.D. Ill.
1978); Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1228, 1250-51 (D. Del. 1978); Indiana Nat'l Bank v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
457 F. Supp. 1028, 1032 (S.D. Ind. 1977), aJ'd,578 F.2d 180 (7th Cir. 1978). See aLso Cook v.
Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 692 (Ist Cir. 1978) (court reserves judgment on whether reckless
conduct can result in § 10(b) liability); Nassar & Co. v. SEC, 566 F.2d 790, 796 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (Leventhal, J., concurring) ("The concept that recklessness may serve as a surrogate for
subjective intent is not new to the law.').
254 The above rationales are exclusive and are based on different lines of analysis. Accordingly, the acceptance of one precludes adoption of the other.
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through press releases, correspondence with shareholders, and communications with the financial press, and yet avoid section 10(b) liability in
private actions for damages by including these statements in documents
filed with the SEC. Even under an exclusive construction, such an interpretation cannot be countenanced. Misrepresentations and nondisclosures contained in documents that are not filed, even if identical to those
contained in documents that are filed, constitute separate wrongs that
courts should redress without the encumbrances of the section 18(a) requirements. This analysis, even under exclusivity, is consistent with the
statutory framework, and is necessary if the remedial scheme for
255
aftermarket trading abuses is to have any efficacious purpose.
The causation standard under section 18(a) requires that the mate256
rially false or misleading statement affect the price of the security.
The plaintiff should be able to satisfy this requirement by showing a
purchase or sale, that the statement contained in the filed document was
materially false or misleading, and that, if applicable, when such statement became known in the financial community as being false or misleading, the price of the security reflected this event within a reasonably
short time thereafter. 25 7 Although one may claim that this standard is
inappropriate on the premise that the nexus between the false or misleading statement and the damage caused is too tenuous, imposing a
more stringent causation requirement would make recovery under section 18(a) all but impossible. An alternative approach would allow the
defendant, after the plaintiff satisfies the causation standard stated
above, to show affirmatively that the misleading statement did not affect
the price of the security or that unrelated factors contributed to the
25 8
plaintiffs loss.
Another important issue in regard to the scope of section 18(a) is
the effect, if any, that incorporation by reference will have on the reme255 It is clear, however, that the SEC can sue for injuctive relief for violations of § 10(b).
Unlike private parties, the Commission is not required to prove reliance and causation. See,
e.g., SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 629 F.2d 62, 75-77 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012
(1980); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 277-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), a 'd in
relevantpart, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971). Moreover, under
appropriate circumstances, the Commission can obtain, as ancillary or other equitable relief,
disgorgement or rescission on behalf of aggrieved investors. See note 154 supra.
256 For the text of § 18(a), see note 12 supra.
257 See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816
(1976) ("We think causation is adequately established in the impersonal stock exchange context by proof of purchase and of the materiality of the misrepresentations, without direct
proof of reliance."). See also cases cited in note 246 supra.
258
f Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256, 262 (5th Cir. 1978) (recovery precluded under
§ 10(b) if defendant can prove plaintiff's nonreliance); Securities Act of 1933, § 11(e), 15
U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1976) ("[I]f the defendant proves that any portion or all of such damages
represents other than the depreciation in value of such security resulting from such [materially false or misleading] part of the registration statement, with respect to which his liability is
asserted,. . . such portion of or all such damages shall not be recoverable.').
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dial scheme. Generally, annual reports to shareholders are not "filed"
documents for section 18(a) purposes. 2 59 In 1980, the Commission
adopted amendments designed to facilitate integration of the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 disclosure systems. 260 Under the amendments, the annual report to shareholders may
become the cornerstone disclosure document. In this respect, a principal
feature is the establishment of uniform disclosure requirements for both
the Form 10-K and the annual report to shareholders. The restructured
Form 10-K requires that certain basic financial information be set
forth, and that this same information, in turn, may be incorporated by
reference from the shareholder report into the Form 10-K. 26' Under an
exclusive construction, such incorporation by reference may be detrimental to registrant liability concerns. Because the shareholder report is
widely disseminated, plaintiffs should find it significantly easier to prove
reliance and causation than in current actions seeking redress under section 18(a).262 Such incorporation by reference also raises the question
whether courts should relegate plaintiffs, who could otherwise bring a
section 10(b) claim for material misstatements or omissions contained in
259 See, e.g., Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903
(1969); Kulchok v. Government Employees Life Ins. Co., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEc. L. REP. (GCH) 1 96,002 (D.D.C. 1977), order withdrawn in light offinaljudgment and settlement, C.A. No. 76-206 (D.D.C. July 28, 1978); Dillon v. Berg, 326 F. Supp. 1214, 1231 & n.27
(D. Del.), aj'd, 453 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1971); Rule 14a-3(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(c) (1982).
260 See Securities Act Release Nos. 6231-34 (Sept. 2, 1980), in 20 SEC DOCKET 1059-61
(1980).
261 The amendments call for a more meaningful analysis of the registrant's business and
financial condition, including the market price of the registrant's securities and its statement
of dividend policy, selected financial data, management's discussion and analysis of the registrant's financial condition, and supplementary financial information. The amendments also
require discussion of the financial statements and changes in financial condition in their entirety, thereby prompting registrants to focus on liquidity and capital resources in addition to
income. Apparently due in part to commentator concern that incorporation might affect the
readability of the stockholder report, the SEC elected to make such incorporation from the
annual report to shareholders into the Form 10-K optional, rather than mandatory, for reporting companies. See SEC Approves Integration ofForm 10-K, Annual Report; Proposes New Registration System Basedon Issuer Size, SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 568, at D-1 (Aug. 27, 1980);
note 260 supra. See also the most recent SEC integration releases adopting components of the
integrated disclosure system; Securities Act Release Nos. 6383-85 (Mar. 3, 1982); note 191
supra.
262 See Grienenberger, Recent Disclosure Developmentr, in TWELFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
SECURITIES REGULATION 273 (Transcript Series) (A. Fleischer, M. Lipton, R. Mundheim, R.
Santoni eds. 1980); Merow, CorporateFilings: Director'sResponsitibilites, in TWELFTH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 45, 54 (Transcript Series) (A. Fleischer, M. Lipton,
R. Mundheim & R. Santoni eds. 1980) (statement of A.A. Sommer); Sommer, The Annual
Report: A Pime DisclosureDocument, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1093, 1098; Note, supra note 10, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. at 128. Although the shareholder report is not a filed document, reliance on the
identical information that is contained in the filed document, as would be the case when a
registrant incorporates by reference, should suffice. See also Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v.
National Student Mktg. Corp., 461 F. Supp. 999, 1006 n. 13 (D.D.C. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 650 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); Jacobson v. Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 445 F. Supp. 518, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); notes 148-49 supra.
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shareholder reports, to solely a section 18(a) cause of action, provided
that an exclusive construction were adopted. The courts should answer
this question in the negative. These reports, delivered to shareholders,
are not "filed" documents under section 18(a), 263 and the subsequent
264
incorporation by reference of information contained in these reports
265
should not alter this situation.
H.

Altemative Remedies

If the courts ultimately adopt an exclusive construction of section
18(a), aggrieved litigants may have no recourse but to seek alternative
remedies. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act 266 and section 29(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act are relevant in this context. 267 Because both of

these provisions have been the subject of extensive commentary,2 68 the
following discussion addresses only the limited subject matter at issue.
Section 17(a) is a broad antifraud provision. Its statutory language
has been incorporated almost verbatim into a number of statutory and
regulatory provisions, 269 including rule 10b-5. 270 The lower federal
See note 259 supra.
The Commission apparently has the authority to require that such shareholder reports be "filed." See Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 915 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
903 (1969); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 23(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1976). On occasion, it has exercised this authority. See Rule 12b-23(d), 17 C.F.R. § 240.12-23(d) (1982).
265 Once documents filed with the SEC contain or incorporate false or misleading statements, providing only a § 18(a) cause of action in this context would enable malfeasants to
avoid § 10(b) liability in private actions for damages. This result is contrary to both the
legislative framework and public policy. But see note 264 supra.
266
For complete text of § 17(a), see note 29 supra.
267
Section 29(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1976), provides:
263
264

Every contract made in violation of any provision of this chapter or of
any rule or regulation thereunder, and every contract [including any contract
for listing a security on an exchange] . . . the performance of which involves
the violation of, or the continuance of any relationship or practice in violation
of, any provision of this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder, shall be
void (1) as regards the rights of any person who, in violation of any such
provision, rule, or regulation, shall have made or engaged in the performance
of any such contract, and (2) as regards the rights of any person who, not
being a party to such contract, shall have acquired any right thereunder with
actual knowledge of the facts by reason of which the making or performance
of such contract was in violation of any such provision, rule, or
regulation....
268 For commentary on § 17(a), see, e.g., Hazen, supra note 154; Horton, Section 17(a) of
the 1933 Securities Act-The Wrong Placefor a Private Right, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 44 (1973); Steinberg, supra note 30. For a discussion of § 29(b), see Gruenbaum & Steinberg, supra note 38.
269 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976) (proscribing deceptive, fraudulent, and manipulative acts or practices, and the making of false or misleading material statements in connection with a tender offer); id § 80b-6 (forbidding fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative
actions by investment advisers); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (1982) (requiring statements and reports to include material information necessary to ensure that the statements are not misleading); id § 240.14a-9 (forbidding solicitation by means of materially false or misleading proxy
statements).
270 For the text of rule 1Ob-5, see note 3 supra.
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courts disagree over whether an implied right of action exists under the
section. 27 1 Even if the courts were to recognize such a right, however, it
appears that under an exclusive construction plaintiffs would derive little benefit. The primary motivation for private litigants to use section
17(a) is that it enables them to assert arguments that recent Supreme
2 72
Court decisions now preclude them from raising under section 10(b).

An exclusive construction of section 18(a), however, would limit aggrieved purchasers and sellers to sue for damages only under section
18(a), based on alleged false or misleading statements contained in
documents filed with the SEC pursuant to the Exchange Act. Accordingly, under an exclusive construction of section 18(a), the existence of a
private right of action for damages under section 17(a) does not aid
plaintiffs.
271 Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1040 n.2 (7th Cir. 1979) (finding a
cause of action under § 17(a)); Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979) (same); Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 99 (4th Cir. 1975)
("§ 17(a) supports a private damage claim for the fraudulent sale of a security"); Roth v.
Bank of the Commonwealth, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,267
(W.D.N.Y. 1981) (recognizing implied right of action under § 17(a)); Demoe v. Dean Witter
& Co., 476 F. Supp. 275, 278 (D. Alaska 1979)) (private right of action under § 17(a)(3) but
not under§ 17(a)(1) or§ 17(a)(2));Inre Gap Stores Litig., 457 F. Supp. 1135, 1142 (N.D. Cal.
1978) (private right of action implied under § 17(a)); Valles Salgado v. Piedmont Capital
Corp., 452 F. Supp. 853, 857-58 (D.P.R. 1978) (§ 17(a) provides implied private damages
remedy for fraudulent purchase of mutual fund shares); cf. Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 509
F.2d 1287, 1293 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976) (allowing private damages
claimed under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act; court need not decide existence of private remedy
for violation of § 17(a) of Securities Act). But see Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561
F.2d 152, 159 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978) (rejecting implied right of
action under § 17(a)); In re New York Municipal Sec. Litig., 507 F. Supp. 169, 186-87
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (no implied private right of action against municipal issuers under § 17(a)
based on legislative history and construction of §§ 11 & 12(2)); McFarland v. Memorex
Corp., 493 F. Supp. 631, 649-53 (N.D. Cal. 1980)) (no implied right of action under § 17(a)
based on application of Redinglon and Lewis); Woods v. Homes & Structures, Inc., 489 F.
Supp. 1270, 1284-88 (D. Kan. 1980) ("Plaintiffs will not be permitted to circumvent the restrictions of the 1934 Act and the express remedy of Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act via an
implied Section 17(a) action."); Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890, 90305 (D. Me. 1971) (review of legislative history and statutory construction indicates § 17(a) not
intended to provide private damage remedy). See also Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 488
F.2d 912, 914 (4th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974) (in actions for rescission of oil
and gas production payments, court implied sub silentio
private cause of action under § 17(a));
Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1089, 1095 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (upholding implied
private right of action under §§ 17(a)(1) and (3); § 17(a)(2) action subject to § 12(2)
limitations).
272 These issues include whether offerees have standing to bring an implied right of action for damages, and whether they are required to show scienter in such actions. For discussion of these issues, see Steinberg, supra note 30, at 175-85. Moreover, the propriety of
cumulative remedies between § 17(a) and §§ 11 and 12(2) remains an open question. If
courts imply a private right of action for damages under § 17(a), they should resolve the issue
of cumulative remedies as proposed in the discussion of §§ 11 and 12(2) and their overlap
with § 10(b). Although it appears unlikely, the Supreme Court may address the propriety of
cumulative remedies between § 17(a) and § 11 in Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640
F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S.Ct. 1766 (1982). See notes 171-93 and accompanying text supra.
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An exception to this principle apparently exists when the plaintiff
seeks an equitable remedy. 273 Rescission is one equitable remedy that a
court may grant under provisions such as section 10(b) and perhaps section 17(a). 2 74 Once the parties have consummated a transaction, however, courts are extremely reluctant to grant the aggrieved litigant the
remedy of rescission except in the most egregious situations.2 75 In this
respect, section 29(b) may serve as a potent weapon for such parties.
2 76
Although some courts have recognized the vitality of this provision,
others have declined to apply it, reasoning in part that the language of
the statute is "draconian. '27 7 With a limited number of exceptions, section 29(b) provides that a violating party to a contract, or his successor
who takes with knowledge, shall have no rights under the contract, even
when performance of the contract has been rendered. 278 Conceivably,
therefore, section 29(b) may provide an aggrieved purchaser or seller of
securities with an absolute right of rescission, irrespective of the poten279
tial exclusivity limitation for damages contained in section 18(a).
273

An action for equitable relief may be available under § 18(a). See note 240 supra.
See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 386-88 (1970); Occidental Life
Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan & Assocs., 496 F.2d 1255, 1268 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023
(1974).
275 See cases cited in note 274 supra.
276 See, e.g., Regional Propreties, Inc. v. Financial & Real Estate Consulting Co., 678 F.2d
552 (5th Cir. 1982); Eastside Church of Christ v. National Plan, Inc., 391 F.2d 357 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 913 (1968); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 741-42 (8th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Saunders v. Oppenheimer Gov't Sec., Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,318 (D. Or. 1981); Brown v. Producers Livestock Loan
Co., 469 F.2d 27 (D. Utah 1978).
277 See, e.g., Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan & Assocs., 496 F.2d 1255, 1265-67 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974); Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1149
(2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971); Gannett Co. v.
Register Publishing Co., 428 F. Supp. 818,830-31 (D. Conn. 1977); Freeman v. Marine Midland Bank-New York, 419 F. Supp. 440, 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). But see Regional Properties,
Inc. v. Financial & Real Estate Consulting Co., 678 F.2d 552, 561 n.16 (5th Cir. 1982).
278 It appears that the § 29(b) remedy is available only when there has been a violation
of another section of the Exchange Act or any of the rules or regulations promulgated thereunder. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 276-77 supra.
279 See Gruenbaum & Steinberg, supra note 38, at 53:
With the recent Supreme Court decisions restricting the reach, scope, and
effect of the federal securities laws, injured parties frequently may find themselves without adequate redress. The express provision contained in Section
29(b) may provide a viable remedy for aggrieved litigants. The section arguably provides a complainant who has rights under a contract formed or performed in violation of the Exchange Act and who has standing to sue for the
substantive violation with the right to rescind the contract.
Some courts have recognized the "devastating" and "Draconian" effect
of the section, but have refused to implement its express provisions. Such an
interpretation ignores the section's clear language and the Act's overriding
congressional objective of investor protection. Given section 29(b)'s apparent
meaning, it conceivably extends to void any transaction, from a simple
purchase or sale of securities, to a complex proxy fight, merger, tender offer,
reorganization, or other transaction, when there has been a violation of the
Exchange Act or any of the rules or regulations prescribed thereunder.
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CUMULATIVE REMEDIES
CONCLUSION

This Article's analysis of the propriety and scope of cumulative
remedies under the federal securities laws indicates that the choice between a cumulative and an exclusive construction is not merely a matter
of semantics or solely of theoretical relevance. Rather, it has a crucial
substantive impact on the ability of injured victims of fraudulent misconduct to obtain meaningful redress. Because an exclusive construction
of section 18(a), and to a somewhat lesser extent section 9, may well
deny aggrieved parties any relief and will impair the integrity of the
marketplace, the courts should reject such an interpretation. In addition, an exclusive construction is objectionable because it represents an
unduly narrow view of congressional intent. Although a cumulative approach is recommended with respect to overlap between section 10(b)
and sections 11 and 12(2), such a result is not as vital as in the section 9
and section 18(a) contexts. If courts ultimately adopt exclusivity for
either section 11 or 12(2), however, it is important that such exclusivity
extend only to those persons who are within the scope of the subject
provision and only to those situations in which the provision would apply. The adoption of this suggested approach would ensure that victims
of fraudulent misconduct can obtain meaningful federal redress. At the
same time, such a construction comports with the legislative framework
and does not place undue burdens upon potential defendants.

See also Regional Properties, Inc. v. Financial & Real Estate Consulting Co., 678 F.2d 552,
559 (5th Cir. 1982) ("[A] person can avoid a contract under section 29(b) if he can show that
(1) the contract involved a 'prohibited transaction,' (2) he is in contractual privity with the
defendant, and (3) he is 'in the class of persons the Act was designed to protect.' ").

